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THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: REVIEW OF ITS




During World War I, the authorities of the Turkish Ottoman Empire
carried out one of the largest genocides in world history, destroying huge
portions of its minority Armenian population. That genocide followed
decades of persecution, punctuated by two similar but smaller rounds of
massacres in the 1894-96 and 1909 periods, which claimed two hundred
thousand Armenian lives. In all, over one million Armenians were put to
death during World War I. Adding to this figure are the several hundred
thousand Armenians who perished in the course of the Turkish attempt to
extend the genocide to Russian Armenia in the Transcaucus during the
spring and summer of 1918, as well as in the fall of 1920 when Ankara's
fledgling government ordered General Karabekir's army to "physically
annihilate Armenia." The European Powers, who defeated the Turks time
and again on the battlefield, were unable or unwilling to prevent this mass
murder.1 Of even more consequence, they failed to secure punishment of
the perpetrators in the aftermath of the war, despite the fact that they had
publicly committed to doing so. The events of that time have subsequently
slipped into the shadows of world history, thus acquiring the imagery of
"the Forgotten Genocide." To this day, Turkey denies the genocidal intent
of these massacres. Such a scale of perpetration, at the very least, warrants a
documentary exposure and examination. The results may yet impel the
civilized world to show a greater concern for the depth of the anguish that
has been tormenting Armenians for generations. It may even move the more
enlightened segment of the population of modem Turkey to face the
historical fact of the Armenian Genocide and try to come to terms with it.
Over the past eighty years, the Armenian nation has struggled to bring
1. The terms "Ottomans" and "Turks" are used interchangeably given the historical
interconnections and interplays.
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the history of the Armenian Genocide to light and examine it. Despite the
magnitude of the disaster, the international community has only recently
officially recognized its genocidal character. In April of 1984, a group of
public figures-including three Nobel Prize laureates, including the late
international jurist Sean McBride-conducted "People's Tribunal" hearings
on the Armenian Genocide at the Sorbonne in Paris and adjudged it to be a
crime of genocide without statutory limitations. In August of 1985, the U.N.
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, which had been deadlocked for over fourteen years, "took note,"
by a 14-1 vote (with four abstentions), of the historical fact of the
Armenian Genocide. In June of 1987, the European Parliament declared the
Turkish massacres of World War I to be a crime of genocide under the
terms of the U.N. Convention on Genocide, stipulating that Turkey must
recognize the Armenian genocide before the European Parliament would
favorably consider Turkey's application for membership in the European
Community. The European Parliament labeled Turkey's refusal to do so an
"insurmountable obstacle to consideration of the possibility of Turkey's
accession to the European Community." Moreover, on April 24, 1994, the
wire services of United Press International and the Associated Press
announced that "Israel issued its first official condemnation of the Turkish
Genocide of the Armenians, ending a tradition of silence to appease its
regional ally, Turkey." Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Bellin then told the
Israeli Parliament that Israel would become part of an effort to ensure that
the world remembers the genocide. "We will always reject any attempt to
erase its record, even for some political advantage," he said. Rejecting
Turkish denials of the crime and its claim that the incident was a "civil
war," Bellin declared that "it was not war. It was most certainly massacre
and genocide."
The relatively low impact of the destruction of one million Armenians
on modern public consciousness raises serious questions about the ability of
the international community to prevent or punish acts of genocide. Many
see the lack of action and reaction following the Armenian Genocide as a
critical antecedent of the ensuing Jewish Holocaust during World War 11.
Indeed, it has been reported that, in trying to reassure the doubters of the
morality and viability of his genocidal schemes, Hitler stated, "[w]ho, after
all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?" This historical
connection was raised repeatedly during the U.S. Senate's consideration of
the U.N. Convention on Genocide, which the United States ratified on
February 19, 1986. A score of senators, most notably Kerry and Wilson,
emphasized the historical precedent of the Armenian case and pointed to the
enormous calamity of the Jewish Holocaust, which they claimed was a by-
product of humanity's callous disregard of the Armenians' fate.
Neither were, nor are, other victim groups in the post-Nuremberg world
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exempt from the consequences of the obliviousness to which the Armenians
were subjected. Foremost among the series of genocidal massacres that
stand out in this respect are those that occurred in Bangladesh, Cambodia,
Rwanda, and the Kurdish territory in Iraq. In each one of these cases, a state
system was beset by the pressures of centrifugal movements and
revolutions before being engulfed by wars. Given certain conditions of
simmering international conflicts, war emerges as a catalyst for radical
methods of conflict resolution. From the standpoint of contemporary
international law, the central issue is the relationship between the concept of
war crimes on the one hand, and crimes against humanity on the other.
The recognition of the significance of this relationship in deciding to
initiate legal actions against the offenders was evident in U.N. efforts to
come to grips with the contemporary issues of ethnic cleansing. In its
Resolution 808 (1993), the U.N. Security Council unanimously established
an ad hoc international tribunal to prosecute and punish the perpetrators
associated with the series of wars that were waged in the territories of
former Yugoslavia, especially in the province of Bosnia. An almost
identical initiative was applied to the Rwandan case in November of 1994.
The basis of this initiative was the August 12, 1949, Geneva Civilian
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
The idea was to punish, under international law, the offenders accused of
crimes against humanity.
A note on a specific category of sources and data used in this study may
be in order. They originate from within Ottoman Turkey and her allies
during World War I, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Specifically, these
sources include:
1. Secret and top-secret Ottoman-Turkish state documents, each
one of which was authenticated by ministerial officials before
being introduced in the Turkish Court Martial Proceedings.
2. The importance of the preponderance of German and Austrian
documents anticipating and corroborating the findings of the
Turkish Military Tribunal cannot be overemphasized. As noted
above, Imperial Germany and Imperial Austria-Hungary were
the political and military allies of the Ottoman Empire during
World War I. Their representatives' "confidential," "secret," and
"top-secret" reports, mostly composed during the war for
internal and in-house purposes only, have an authenticity and
immediacy not matched by any other available category of
sources and data.
EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The interplay of European attempts to impose reforms and the Turkish
resistance set the stage for a bellicose Turkish response to the escalation of
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the Turko-Armenian conflict. In this clash, the disjunction of European
public law and Turkish customary law deteriorated into a sharp conflict
between the two legal domains. Taking the series of enacted reforms
seriously, the Armenians pressed for their actual implementation as a matter
of legal entitlement. The Turks, however, relied on their common law
claims of traditional super-ordination vis-A-vis the non-Muslim subjects of
the empire. One such cardinal common law principle refers to a rule in the
Akdi Zimmet (contract with the ruled nationality), which stipulates
cessation of hostility against non-Muslim subjects following their defeat
and submission. Once defeated, these subjects are dehalet 'granted refuge
and protection.' By attempting to influence Turkish national policy in their
favor by enlisting the intercession of foreign powers, the Ottoman Turks
argued that the Armenians had violated this fundamental treaty provision,
and under the prevailing common law, had therefore forfeited the Berat
'grant of exemption and clemency.'
The cycle of massacres preceding the World War I genocide was
rationalized essentially in this fashion. In describing the scenes of the 1895
Urfa Massacre and the entire 1894-96 era of Abdul Hamit Massacres, the
Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy, who was fluent in Turkish and
who based his report on evidence supplied to him by local Muslims, wrote
the following:
[The perpetrators] are guided in their general action by the
prescriptions of the Sheri Law. That law prescribes that if the
'rayah' [cattle, figuratively speaking] Christian attempts, by having
recourse to foreign powers, to overstep the limits of privileges
allowed to them by their Mussulman masters, and free themselves
from their bondage, their lives and property are to be forfeited, and
are at the mercy of the Mussulmans. To the Turkish mind the
Armenians had tried to overstep those limits by appealing to foreign
powers, especially England. They therefore considered it their
religious duty and a righteous thing to destroy and seize the lives
and property of the Armenians .... 2
This reasoning is confirmed, as follows, by the contemporary Israeli
historian, Bat Ye'or: the Armenian quest for reforms invalidated their "legal
status," which involved a "contract." This "breach ... restored to the umma
[the Muslim community] its initial right to kill the [subjugated minority] the
dhimmis, [and] seize their property .... I
In resorting to massacre as a method of conflict resolution, the religious
tenets of the preeminent Islamic common law destroyed the public law's
2. FO 195/1930 Folio 34/187.
3. BAT YE'OR, THE DHIMMI: JEWS AND CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM 48, 67, 101 (D. Maisel,
P. Fenton, & D. Littman trans. 1985).
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efficacy. To emphasize the religious thrust of the laws, the perpetrators
performed Muslim rites when killing their victims whenever suitable. In
reference to Urfa, a British historian named Lord Kinross provides the
following example:
When a large group of young Armenians were brought before a
sheikh, he had them thrown down on their backs and held by their
hands and feet. Then, in the words of an observer, he recited verses
of the Koran and "cut their throats after the Mecca rite of sacrificing
sheep."4
This lethal disjunction between public and common laws in the
Ottoman system was predicted by Grand Vizier Redid. In his famous
Memorandum of Dissent regarding the Reform Act of 1856, Redid foresaw
the possibility of bir mukateleyi azime 'a great slaughter' against the non-
Muslims in connection with efforts to establish equality through the
enactment of public laws.5
THE FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF THE
ARMENIANS
Although the European Powers had repeatedly forced Turkey to
4. LORD KINROss, THE OrOMAN CENTURIES 559-560 (1977). The passage, more fully, is
as follows:
[The massacre's] objective, based on the convenient consideration that Armenians
were now tentatively to question their inferior status, was the ruthless reduction,
with a view to elimination, of the Armenian Christians, and the expropriation of
their lands for the Muslem Turks.
Each operation, between the bugle calls, followed a similar pattern. First into a
town there came the Turkish troops, for the purpose of massacre; then came the
Kurdish irregulars and tribesmen for the purpose of plunder. Finally came the
holocaust, by fire and destruction, which spread, with the pursuit of the fugitives
and mopping-up operations, throughout the lands and villages of the surrounding
province. This murderous winter of 1895 thus saw the decimation of much of the
Armenian population and the devastation of their property in some twenty distinct
districts of eastern Turkey. Often the massacres were timed for a Friday, when the
Moslems were in their mosques[.] .. .Cruellest and most ruinous of all were the
massacres at Urfa, where the Armenian Christians numbered a third of the total
population. . . .When the bugle blast ended the day's operations some three
thousand refugees poured into the cathedral, hoping for sanctuary. But the next
morning-a Sunday-a fanatical mob swarmed into the church in an orgy of
slaughter, rifling its shrines with cries of "Call upon Christ to prove Himself a
greater prophet than Mohammed." Then they amassed a large pile of straw matting,
which they spread over the litter of corpses and set alight with thirty cans of
petroleum. The woodwork of the gallery where the crowd of women and children
crouched, wailing with terror, caught fire, and all perished in the flames.
Punctiliously at three-thirty in the afternoon the bugle blew once more, and the
Moslem officials proceeded around the Armenian quarter to proclaim that the
massacres were over .... The total casualties in the town, including those in the
cathedral, amounted to eight thousand dead.
5. AHMET CEVDET PASA, TEZAKIR 79 (C. Baysun ed., 1953).
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publicly proclaim equality for its non-Muslim subjects, they were unwilling
or unable to force the Ottomans to honor such promises. As seen above,
Turkey had many opportunities to make good on its agreements but
inevitably failed to do so. By 1878, when the Treaty of Berlin was signed,
the Armenian Question had ceased to be a merely domestic problem for the
Ottoman Empire. Article 61 of that treaty read:
The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay,
the ameliorations and reforms demanded by local requirements in
the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their
security against the Circassians and the Kurds. . . . It will make
known periodically the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who
will superintend their application.6
Commenting on the significance of this clause and Article 62 of the
treaty-which provided for religious liberty, civil and political rights, as
well as admission to public employments, functions, and honors-Rolin-
Jaequemyns asserted that the Armenians were placed "under the express
protection of international law of contract, and under the control of the
Great Powers. The natural obligations of the Turkish Government... have
become as regards the Armenians, strict engagements with the States which
are parties to the Treaty ... ,7 In reality, however, not only were the
Armenians denied protection, but their condition of physical security
deteriorated. They suffered a string of massacres between 1894 and 1896.
The series of conflagrations was launched with the 1894 Sassoun
Massacres under circumstances not unlike those surrounding the 1876
Balkan insurrections and the Turkish response to them. The indigenous
Armenian peasantry had long been enduring, among other forms of
oppression, a system of double taxation that had triggered the uprising of
the Slavs in the Balkans. The Armenians were being forced to pay taxes not
only to government officials ostensibly representing the central government
but also to local Kurdish chieftains. The resulting uprising of the Sassoun
mountaineers, who are often compared with the mountaineers of
Montenegro, was thus analogous to that of the peasants of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Like the Armenians in eastern Turkey, they too were
subjected to a system of double taxation by two separate classes of
oppressors: extortionist Turkish officials and local Muslim landowners and
tribal chiefs, who were themselves Slavs but had converted to Islam. Nor do
the parallels end here. Both victim groups were also exposed to external
agitation, including some tacit encouragement from Russia in the case of
the Balkan subject nationalities.
6. M. G. ROLIN-JAEQUEMYNS, ARMENIA, THE ARMENIANS, AND THE TREATIES 38-39
(1891).
7. Id. at 39.
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Given the vulnerability of the Armenians geographically,
demographically, and politically, the retaliation by Sultan Abdul Hamit
(1876-1908) was as severe as it could be under the circumstances. Entire
villages were annihilated, and hundreds of trapped victims were mercilessly
slaughtered-many of them burned alive, often with the assistance of
regular army detachments and irregulars. As usual, the Powers went
through the motions of protests, collective investigations and inquiries,
denunciations, and warnings, but there was no interest or inclination to
initiate punitive measures. Once more, these Powers allowed themselves to
be mollified by Turkish promises of effective reforms. Turkey monopolized
for herself the right to exclusively superintend the implementation aspect of
the promises in the name of "national sovereignty." These massacres were
perpetrated "at a time when the regime was hard pressed by European
Powers and was afraid of external intervention .. .8 The estimated number
of victims ranged from 100,000 to 200,000.9
The following three circumstances set in motion the process of
deterioration leading to these massacres: the subversion of public law by the
Turkish authorities, the lack of solidarity among the European Powers in
ensuring Turkish adherence to the public laws, and the lack of any national
ties between the Armenians and the European Powers.
8. Robert Melson, A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894-1896, 24
COMP. STUD. IN SOC'Y & HIST. 481, 507 (1982).
9. Kaiser Wilhelm 11 informed British Colonel Swaine in Berlin that up to December 31,
1895, approximately eighty thousand Armenians had been slain (umgebracht). DAS TORKISCHE
PROBLEM 1895, 10 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPAtSCHEN KABINETTE 1871-1914, Doc. No.
2572, at 251 (transcript of Kaiser's dictation) (J. Lepsuis, A. Bartholdy, & F. Thimme, eds. 3rd ed.
1927). British Ambassador, Sir William White, however estimated one hundred thousand victims
up to early December of 1895. Id., Doc. No. 2479, at 127. H.A. Loze, the French Ambassador at
Vienna, cited the combined figure of two hundred thousand to cover those actually killed as well
as those expected to perish from "hunger and cold during the coming winter." FRENCH FOREIGN
OFFICE, 12 DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES FRANCAIS 1871-1900, Doc. No. 256, at 384 (1951)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES]. German Turkophile and Foreign Office operative
Ernest Jackh estimates the number of Armenian victims of Hamit era as follows: two hundred
thousand killed, fifty thousand expelled, and one million pillaged and plundered. ERNST JACKH,
DER AUFSTEIGENDE HALBMOND, 139 (Berlin 6th ed. 1916). Such losses of human lives cannot be
separated, however, from the collateral material damage they entail. The real test of the success of
exterminatory assaults is the extent to which the social fabric and cultural institutions undergirding
the victim population as a national or ethnic entity are devastated in the process. Following his
two month (May-June 1896) post-massacre trip to the sites of the massacres, Johannes Lepsius
compiled the following data: 2,500 towns and villages were desolated and 645 churches and
monasteries destroyed. The survivors of 559 villages and hundreds of families in cities were
forcibly (zwangsweise) converted to Islam. Included in this are 15,000 Armenians, each from the
provinces of Erzurum and Harput, who had converted under threat of death. Moreover, 328
churches were recast into mosques and 546,000 people were reduced to a state of destitution
(Not). In addition, 508 churches and monasteries were completely plundered and 21 Protestant and
170 Gregorian-Apostolic priests were killed. JOHANNE LEPSIUS, ARMENIEN UND EUROPA 34-35
(1897).
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Continued subversion ofpublic law
As in the case of the previous reform acts of 1839 and 1856, as well as
the 1876 Constitution, the Berlin Treaty clauses regarding the treatment of
nationalities and minorities remained dead letters, especially with respect to
the Armenians. Their formal enactment was done as a matter of expediency
and was intended to forestall more drastic initiatives on the part of the
Powers. In a dispatch to Berlin, Prince von Radolin-the German
Ambassador-informed his Chancellor of a conversation with Sultan Abdul
Hamit. During that exchange, "[the Sultan] most solemnly swore to me that
under no circumstances would he yield on the matter of 'the unjust'
Armenian reforms." 10 Moreover, the Ottoman system was ill-suited to
extend equality to the Armenians socially, politically, or legally. As the
prominent Harvard historian William Langer had concluded, "It was
perfectly obvious that the Sultan was determined to end the Armenian
[Q]uestion by exterminating the Armenians.""
Lack of cohesion among the European Powers
The European interventions historically hinged upon a modicum of
consensus among the Great Powers. Until the 1878 Berlin Treaty, the
unified insistence of England and Russia-the dominant Powers in the
Concert of Europe--could induce, if not compel, Turkey to submit to some
degree of intervention by the Powers. 2 These lines of cooperation,
however, were not exclusive of rivalries on many other levels, nor were
these interventions purely "humanitarian."' 3 The Treaty of Berlin ushered in
10. 9 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPAISCHEN KABINETTE 1871-1914, supra note 9, No.
2184, at 203.
11. 1 WILLIAM LANGER, THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIALISM 1890-1902, at 203 (1935).
12. The cooperation of these two Powers started with the April 4, 1826, St. Petersburg
Protocol, in which they agreed to mediate between the Turks and the Greeks on the basis of
complete autonomy for Greece under Turkish suzerainty. See JONATHAN ARTHUR RANSOME
MARRIOTT, THE EASTERN QUESTION: AN HISTORICAL STUDY IN EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 214
(4th ed., 1958). The July 6, 1827, Treaty of London, which under the name of "humanitarian
intervention" threatened Turkey with military support for Greece, was likewise initiated jointly by
Britain and Russia. Id. at 218. The December 1876 Constantinople Conference, at which the
Powers insisted on European control and supervision of Ottoman reforms, was the consequence of
Anglo-Russian agreement to the terms of the projected peace negotiated between Lord Salisbury
and General Ignatief, the representative plenipotentiaries. BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE, BLUE BOOK,
TURKEY, No. 1 (1877), Doc. No. 1053, at 719. The July 13, 1878, Berlin Treaty followed a secret
Anglo-Russian Agreement (May 30, 1878), engineered by Count Shuvalof, the Russian
ambassador to Britain. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY 735-736 (William Langer rev. ed.
1948). The Anglo-Russian accords on major issues were thus crucial to the Concert of Europe's
united action bringing pressure to bear upon the Ottoman authorities.
13. In the Gentleman's Agreement of 1844, Tsar Nicholas I proposed a joint action for the
disposition of the Ottoman Empire in the event of its collapse, which was then anticipated. Nine
years later, during discussions with Lord Seymour, the Tsar described the Ottoman Empire as "the
sick man," and bid for its partition. 62 DAS STAATSARCHIV, Nos. 5612-13, at 167. In the July 8,
1976, Reichstadt Agreement, Russia and Austria laid out their contingency plans involving
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a period of increasingly acute distrust between Russia and England, thus
ensuring the gradual collapse of the Concert of Europe. The necessity of
cooperation among the Powers and the ever-present suspicion of ulterior
motives14 were limitations often inherent in the principle of multilateral
intervention, whether humanitarian or otherwise.
As European concern for Turkey's need to implement Article 61 of the
Berlin Treaty lessened and eventually evaporated in the face of the Anglo-
Russian rivalry and suspicion, these limitations became distinct liabilities
for the Armenians. 15 While England appeared willing to intercede if joined
territorial acquisitions in the event the Turks should suffer defeat at the hands of the Serbs and
Montenegrins. 3 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPAISCHEN KABINETTE 1871-1914, supra note 9,
No. 605, at 293. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY, supra note 12, at 724. In the January 15,
1877, Budapest Convention between Russia and Austria, similar plans were devised for disposing
of Turkish territories. Id. at 735. Most importantly, Austria was given a mandate to occupy Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and to garrison the district of Novi Bazar, a strip between Serbia and
Montenegro. Similarly, in a secret Anglo-Turkish agreement, Great Britain took Cyprus from
Ottoman dominion. For the French text of the agreement see 3 GABRIEL EFFENDI
NORADOUGHIAN, RECUIL D'ACTES INTERNATIONAUX DE L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN 522-25 (1902).
For the English text see 4 EDWARD HERTSLET, THE MAP OF EUROPE BY TREATY 1875-1891, at
2721-22 (1891). All of these events were directly connected to the Treaty of Berlin. To the
Russians, the benefits of victory in the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish war were minimal enough to plant
in their minds the seeds of bitterness toward Great Britain, which lasted for decades.
14. See Josef L. Kunz, The United Nations Convention on Genocide, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 738,
742 (1949) (discussing Lauterpacht's view of the subversion of humanitarian intervention for
"selfish purposes").
15. These rivalries found expression in the British challenge to the provisions of Article 16 of
the San Stefano Treaty, in which Russia had acquired the right to continue to occupy eastern
(primarily Armenian) provinces of Turkey, which they had conquered through the 1877-78
Russo-Turkish War, until Turkey had carried out the reforms she had promised. Considering the
presence of Russian troops in that region a threat to British colonial interests in India, Disraeli
went through the motions of preliminary mobilization to signal to Russia his intent to wage war, if
necessary to force Russian withdrawal. This British maneuver directly affected Armenia. As
Lloyd George outlines:
Had it not been for our sinister intervention, the great majority of Armenians would
have been placed, by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, under the protection of the
Russian flag.
The Treaty of San Stefano provided that Russian troops should remain in
occupation of the Armenian provinces until satisfactory reforms were carried out.
By the Treaty of Berlin (1878)-which was entirely due to our minatory pressure
and which was acclaimed by us as a great British triumph which brought '[p]eace
with honour'-that article was superseded. Armenia was sacrificed on the triumphal
altar we had erected. The Russians were forced to withdraw; the wretched
Armenians were once more placed under the heel of their old masters, subject to a
pledge to 'introduce ameliorations and reforms into the provinces inhabited by
Armenians.' We all know how these pledges were broken for forty years, in spite of
repeated protests from the country that was primarily responsible for restoring
Armenia to Turkish rule. The action of the British Government led inevitably to the
terrible massacres of 1895-97, 1909, and worst of all to the holocausts of 1915. By
these atrocities, almost unparalleled in the black record of Turkish misrule, the
Armenian population was reduced in numbers by well over a million.
Having regard to the part we had taken in making these outrages possible, we
were morally bound to take the first opportunity that came our way to redress the
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by the other Powers, 6 France supported Russia's adamant opposition to
such license for intercession. Germany was even more reluctant to act on
behalf of the Armenians, but unlike the other Powers, she did not
equivocate on her posture. Bismarck, who tried to dissuade England from
interfering in "the internal affairs" of Turkey, articulated that exercise of
realpolitik with brutal frankness. In a dispatch dated May 17, 1883, and
addressed to his Ambassador in London, Bismarck deprecated that
the so-called "Armenian Reforms" [are] ideal and theoretical efforts
constituting the ornamental part of the [Berlin] Congress. Their
practical significance is of very doubtful value and for the
Armenians means [a] double-edged [sword].... I cannot join Lord
Dufferin [British Ambassador to Turkey] in a policy which
sacrifices his practical goals to a temporary philanthropic halo.
A day before, on May 16, Bismarck had told Lord Ampthill (Odo
Russell)-British Ambassador at Berlin-that the concern of the Powers for
the welfare of the subjects of the Sultan "was philanthropy, and that he
wrong we had perpetrated, and in so far as it was our power, to make it impossible
to repeat the horrors for which history will always hold us culpable.
When therefore in the Great War, the Turks forced us into this quarrel, and
deliberately challenged the British Empire to a life and death struggle, we realised
that at last an opportunity had been given us to rectify the cruel wrong for which we
were responsible.
2 DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, MEMOIRS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 811 (1939).
During the November 18, 1918, Parliamentary debates in the House of Commons, Aneurin
Williams raised the same question, declaring:
This country owes a debt to Armenia, because, after all, we more than forty years
ago prevented Armenia from being released by Russia from Turkish tyranny. If we
had not done that, the awful sufferings which have occurred since would not have
occurred. We therefore owe them a debt. We owe them further debt because they
have fought valiantly for us in this War.
16. The tenuous character of this willingness bordered on deception. Diplomatic records
highlight the incidence of frivolous party politics carried out under the guise of "humanitarian
intervention." The British handling of the Armenian Question exemplified the influence of
domestic party squabbles on foreign policy, pitting the Gladstonian liberals against the
conservatives represented by Disraeli, and subsequently by Salisbury. In dismissing Gladstone's
fervent pronouncements in support of efforts to extricate the subject races from the Ottoman yoke,
Disraeli denounced Gladstone as an "unprincipled maniac, extraordinary mixture of envy,
vindictiveness, hypocrisy ... never a gentleman." ANDRE MAUROIS, DISRAELI: A PICTURE OF
THE VICTORIAN AGE 310 (Hamish Miles, trans. 1930).
This overall judgment seems to be corroborated in part by the statement of William
Summers, a liberal MP (and a colleague of Gladstone) who, during a brief visit in Constantinople
in 1890, met with some diplomats. In his September 28, 1890, report to his chancellor in Berlin,
German Ambassador Radowitz, and after describing Summers as the "most energetic supporter of
the Armenian cause in England," quoted Summers: "Gladstone and I are involved in the Armenian
[Q]uestion for the sole purpose of causing difficulties to the Salisbury Cabinet." 9 DIE GROSSE
POLITIK DER EUROPAISCHEN KABINETTE 1871-1914, supra note 9, No. 2178, at 194. This was
the period when Conservatives and Liberals often went out of their way to introduce motions in
the Parliament "in order to embarrass their opponents." GEORGE PEABODY GOOCH, HISTORY OF
MODERN EUROPE 1878-1919, at 244-245 (1923).
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[Bismarck] hated philanthropy in politics." Bismarck then stated that his
main concern was "the new danger looming in the distance in the shape of
an alliance between Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece" against
Turkey. He should, therefore, prefer helping the Sultan prepare for self-
defense.' 7
Apprised of Bismarck's policy amounting to a deliberate derogation
from Article 61, British Minister of Foreign Affairs Granville had ordered
Ambassador Goschen to cease pursuing the Armenian Question two years
earlier at Constantinople "in consequence of the objections raised by the
German Government."18 Kaiser Willhelm II ratified the Bismarckian
attitude regarding the Armenian reforms when, on November 22, 1895, he
declared that "the Berlin Congress was a mistake that entailed grave
consequences. I will never agree to the convening of a second one." A day
earlier, the Kaiser, in dialogue with his wife, had declared that "[t]he Berlin
Congress offers no protection at all to the Christians and doesn't prevent the
Turks from cutting off their necks."19 Austria eventually joined these
Powers in defining the stipulated reforms as moribund and inherently full of
"hidden complications for the Powers."2 For a variety of reasons, the
Powers thus abdicated the responsibilities they had assumed as signatories
to the Treaty of Berlin.
The vague and imprecise terms of the Treaties of Paris and Berlin also
allowed the Powers to hedge and disclaim responsibility. For example,
Article 9 of the Paris Treaty stipulated reforms while prohibiting any
intervention, "either collectively or separately," in the internal affairs of
Turkey. The imprecision of the word "superintend," inserted into the last
paragraph of Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty, compounded the treaty's
ambivalence. The specific functions of superintendence were left undefined,
allowing any signatory to argue that the Powers were contractually
responsible to each other alone. Thus, in practice, the reforms were left
unmonitored. Moreover, Article 61 implicitly proscribed unilateral action
by any of the signatory Powers through the use of the corporate term "the
Powers."'" Sultan Abdul Hamit, whose name and regime are associated
17. The May 17th statement is in 9 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPAISCHEN KABINErTE
1871-1914, supra note 9, at 200, No. 2183. The May 16th statement is in BRITISH DOCUMENTS
ON OTTOMAN ARMENIANS 462, Doc. No. 204 (Bilal N. $im~ir ed. 1983).
18. BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE, BLUE BOOK, TURKEY, No. 6 (1881), Report No. 170, at 322.
19. The November 22, 1895, statement is in 10 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPAISCHEN
KABINETTE 1871-1914, supra note 9, at 114, No. 2464, Kaiser's marginalia. The November 21,
1895, statement is in 10 DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER EUROPAISCHEN KABINETTE 1871 -1914, supra
note 9, at 109, Doc. 2463.
20. DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES, supra note 9, at 371 Doc. No. 248.
21. As England's Duke of Argyll noted, "[W]hat was everybody's business was nobody's
business." DUKE OF ARGYLL, OUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TURKEY 74 (1896). British scholar
Dawson reasserted this point nearly thirty years later: "[N]o solemn international covenant has
been so systematically and openly infringed and ignored, in part by the Signatory Powers
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with the nineteenth-century Armenian massacres, understood the reluctance
of the Powers to intervene actively on behalf of the Armenians and
appreciated their proclivity to take refuge in the imperfections of the Treaty
clauses involved.22 The Powers' only reaction to the massacres was to
remonstrate Turkey and issue ambiguous threats.
The Armenians' lack of ties to any European power
The Armenians' failure to obtain the national emancipation achieved by
other non-Muslim nationalities under the Ottoman rule was also a direct
result of their lack of tutelage and active sponsorship by any of the
European Powers. The Slavic nationalities-the Serbs, the Bulgars, and the
Montenegrins--enjoyed Russian guardianship because of their racial and
ethnic kinship. Religious ties through the Eastern Orthodox Church
accounted for the Russian guardianship of the Greeks and the Romanians of
Wallachia. The French, for their part, virtually rescued the Catholic
Maronites of Lebanon by invading Lebanon and compelling the Turks to
give the Maronites limited autonomy. The Armenians, however, did not
enjoy sufficient religious or ethnic bonds to any European Power and thus
were unable to benefit from similar treatment.
Furthermore, past episodes of the "ingratitude" of Balkan nationalities
that had benefited from outside intervention reduced the Armenians' chance
of receiving similar assistance. Bulgaria, for example, thwarted Russian
attempts at control despite the active Russian support she had received in
the past when freeing herself from Ottoman domination. After that
themselves, as the Treaty which was concluded in Berlin in July, 1878, 'in the name of Almighty
God."' W. H. Dawson, Foreign Policy and Reaction, 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF BRITISH
FOREIGN POLICY 72, 143 (A. W. Ward & G. P. Gooch eds., 1923).
22. Commenting on the impact of this stance upon European diplomats, noted British
historian G. P. Gooch wrote,
The [European] Concert was dead[.] ... [lit became clear that pressure without
the intention of resorting to force stiffened rather than weakened the resistance of
the Sultan, who had no intention of allowing Armenia to go the way of Bulgaria....
The lamentable result of the fitful interest shown by the Powers was to awaken
hopes in the Armenian highlands which could not be fulfilled, and to arouse
suspicions in the breast of the Sultan which were to bear fruit in organized massacre
and outrage in days to come.
G. P. GOOCH, HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE 1878-1919, at 22-23 (1923). In a speech in the
British Parliament, Lord Salisbury-later Foreign and Prime Minister of England-noted
skeptically, "[w]hether it ever will be possible to induce the six Powers to agree together to use,
not diplomatic pressure, but naval and military forces, I very much doubt .... I am sure nothing
can be gained by a compromise between the two[.] ... " M. MACCOLL, THE SULTAN AND THE
POWERS 291 (1896) (citing TIMES (London), Oct. 27, 1890). The standard Turkish reaction to
threats of the use of force was the raising of the spectre of general massacre against the entire
nationality in the given provinces. In the 1860 French intervention in Lebanon, French Foreign
Minister M. Thouvenel dismissed this threat, stating, "[i]f such reasoning were once to be
admitted, it would be put forward on every occasion when an abuse was to be corrected in
Turkey." Id. at 34.
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experience, the Tsars not only studiously dissociated themselves from the
Armenians, but during the reign of Abdul Hamit, they tacitly supported the
Turkish persecution of the Armenians. The Russians explained their
behavior as a way to avoid the emergence of a second Bulgaria on their
southern border." Frank Lascelles, the British Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, quoted Russian Foreign Minister Prince Lobanof-Rostowski as
declaring that he was decidedly opposed to seeing the rise in the proximity
of Russian territory of "another Bulgaria."24
Another factor alienating the Armenians from other Ottoman
nationalities involved geo-political considerations. While all the other
nationalities on whose behalf the European Powers intervened were located
on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, Armenia's historical location
caused her to be regarded as a threat to the Turkish heartland. Logistical
difficulties involved in providing assistance-such as Armenia's lack of
ports for British vessels-further compounded the problem."
The Armenians were also hindered because they lacked the geographic
concentration of the Balkan nationalities. Sultan Abdul Hamit had been
redistricting the heavily Armenian-populated provinces with the intention
of reducing them to numerical minorities, especially in such regions of
historic Armenia as the provinces of Erzerum, Van, Sivas, and Bitlis.
Additionally, a significant portion of the Armenian population in search of
relief from depredations-as well as on a quest for economic
opportunities-resorted to internal migration. The resulting geographic
23. Soon after the Treaty of Berlin, Bulgaria, the prot6g6 of the Russians, was reduced to a
pawn in Russian hands. Russian officers and officials descended on Bulgaria's capital in a swarm
and reduced the country to a Russian province. Any complaint was branded as "ingratitude."
Growing discontent, attended by anti-Russian sentiments, led to the 1881 overthrow of the regime.
Russia responded by appointing Russian generals in Bulgaria, who took their orders directly from
the Tsar, and "Russian generals were appointed to the Interior, War, and Justice [ministries.] ...
In defiance, nationalists in Bulgaria subsequently coined the phrase, "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians."
These are the conditions under which Bulgarian "ingratitude" arose and crystallized. GOOCH,
supra note 22, at 3-6.
24. Letter from Sir F. Lascelles to the Earl of Kimberley (June 13, 1895), in
CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE INTRODUCTION OF REFORMS IN THE ARMENIAN PROVINCES
OF ASIATIC TURKEY 83 (British Foreign Office ed., 1896).
25. Russia was the only power that indeed felt capable of overcoming the logistical
difficulties involved in rescuing the Armenians from Ottoman bondage. Russian policy on this
matter of conflict obtained between territorial sovereignty of the state, on the one end, and the
principle of humanitarian intervention, on the other, was articulated by Russian Foreign Minister
Alexander Gorchakof-who in a November 7, 1876, dispatch to the Russian ambassador to Berlin
Count Paul Shuvalof-stated "if the Great Powers wish to accomplish a real work ... it is
necessary... to recognize that the independence and integrity of Turkey must be subordinated to
the guarantees demanded by humanity, the sentiment of Christian Europe and the general peace."
BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE, in CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE AFFAIRS OF TURKEY 1877,
Doc. No. 1053, at 90. But as British author Pears noted, "Armenians were to be protected if they
would abandon their national Church and become formally united with the Russian faith, but not
otherwise." Sir Edwin Pears, Turkey, Islam and Turanianism, 14 CONTEMP. REV. 373 (1918).
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dispersion diluted the pre-existing density of Armenian population
enclaves, thereby rendering dubious the idea of a concrete Armenian state
analogous to Greece or Bulgaria.
THE USE OF RISING ARMENIAN NATIONAL AWARENESS AS A CATALYST
FOR A NEW OTTOMAN POLICY OF DECIMATION
The international efforts of the European Powers may in fact have
caused the Armenians more harm than good. By helping to raise the
consciousness of the oppressed peoples within Turkey without concurrently
enhancing their power, international actors created a situation in which the
Ottomans had both the incentive and the excuse for dealing with the
"Armenian problem" with massacres. Encouraged by the promises of the
Treaty of Berlin, the Armenians experienced a new sense of national
consciousness, which in turn engendered rising expectations. Sporadic
displays of assertiveness began to erode their tradition of passively
enduring the abuses endemic in the Ottoman system. Additionally, dmigr6
Armenian intellectuals formed committees in the capitals of Europe to
protest these abuses and push for the implementation of the promised
reforms. As the Ottoman regime resisted these agitations and refused to
execute the reforms in any meaningful way, Armenian revolutionary cells
emerged within and without the Empire and braced themselves for resistant
combat. In a report to Paris entitled Expos historique de la question
arm~nienne, long-time French Ambassador Paul Cambon traced the genesis
of the Armenian Question to this period. He wrote:
A high ranking Turkish official told me, "the Armenian [Q]uestion
does not exist but we shall create it." . . . Up until 1881 the idea of
Armenian independence was non-existent. The masses simply
yearned for reforms, dreaming only of a normal administration
under the Ottoman rule. . . . The inaction of the Porte served to
vitiate the good will of the Armenians. The reforms have not been
carried out. The exactions of the officials remained scandalous and
justice was not improved . . . from one end of the Empire to the
other, there is rampant corruption of officials, denial of justice and
insecurity of life .... The Armenian diaspora began denouncing the
administrative misdeeds, and in the process managed to transform
the condition of simple administrative ineptness into one of racial
persecution. It called to the attention of Europe the violation by the
Turks of the Treaty of Berlin and thereby summoned up the image
of Armenian autonomy in the minds of the Armenian population.
France did not respond to the Armenian overtures but the England
of Gladstone did: The Armenian revolutionary movement took off
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from England26 ... [A]s if it were not enough to provoke Armenian
discontent, the Turks were glad to amplify it b[y] the manner in
which they handled it. In maintaining that the Armenians were
conspiring, the Armenians ended up conjuring the reality of her
existence. . . . The harsh punishment of conspirators, the
maintenance in Armenia of a veritable regime of terror, arrests,
murders, rapes, all this shows that Turkey is taking pleasure in
precipitating the events [in relation to] an inoffensive population. In
reality the Armenian Question is nothing but an expression of the
antagonism between England and Russia. ... Where does Armenia
begin, and where does it end?27
Later in the report, Cambon prophetically questioned the reasonableness of
transporting the Armenians to Mesopotamia, a solution reportedly
contemplated by the Ottoman government. Mesopotamia would later serve
as the valley of the Armenian Genocide.
THE PRE-WORLD WAR I ANTECEDENTS: THE DEBACLES IN THE YOUNG
TURK ITTIHADIST EPA (1909-13)28
The 1909 twin Adana Massacres: The actual prelude to the World War I
Genocide
That the commitment to constitutionalism was both tenuous and less
than uniform-as far as all ethnic elements of the empire were concerned-
was a fact that came into full view in April of 1909. It is a fact that the
March 31/April 13, 1909, counter-revolution-staged by an assortment of
Islamic fundamentalists, opponents of Ittihad, and Abdul Hamit loyalists-
was crushed when contingents of the Ottoman III's Army marched into
Istanbul from Saloniki and restored both the Ittihadist regime and the
principle of constitutionality that was identified with that regime. A singly
contributing factor to that outbreak was the assassination of the chief editor
of a Turkish newspaper who, defying all threats to his life, was severely
criticizing Ittihadist measures of autocracy and coerciveness. The reference
is to Hasan Fehmi, Editor of Serbesti. The failure of the authorities to track
down and apprehend the assassin or assassins aroused the ire of many
people and precipitated the counter-revolution. Even more significantly,
26. In an exchange with his German colleague Baron von Saurma, Russian Ambassador
Nelidof commented that the Armenians were frustrated not only by the lack of any tangible results
from European intervention, but also by the ensuing massacres. DIE GROSSE POLITIK DER
EUROPAiSCHEN KABINETTE, supra note 9, Doc. No. 2426, at 69. See also supra note 16.
27. DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES, supra note 9, at 7174, Doc. Feb. 20, 1894; see also LIVRE
JAUNE, AFFAIRES ARMtNIENS, PROJETS DE RtFORMES DANS L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN 1893-1897,
Doc. No. 6, at 10-13 (1897).
28. The terms "Young Turks," "Ittihad," and "CUP" are seen as interchangeable, even
though CUP seems to be the prevalent modus description.
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this act of plain murder heralded a series of subsequent murders to which
other prominent editors-equally critical of the regime-fell victim. The
culprits of these crimes likewise managed to escape and remain free. As
time progressed and problems mounted, the Young Turk revolutionaries
gradually relinquished their adherence to constitutional principles and
adopted severe measures of repression, thereby surpassing the notoriety of
the preceding Abdul Hamit regime in many respects.
The elusive character of the Ittihadist Young Turk constitutionalist
revolution came into full view with the launching of the two-tier Adana
Massacres in the April 1/14-April 14/27, 1909, period, during which some
twenty-one thousand Armenians fell victim. In contrast to the multitudes of
Armenian residents in the Ottoman capital where the counter-revolution
was unleashed, the Armenians in Adana were recognized as the
demonstrative champions of the Ittihadist constitutional liberty principles.
Intoxicated with their new-found freedoms, they flaunted them to the point
of provoking many Turks-some of whom were Abdul Hamit loyalists who
resented the new leadership of the Young Turks; others were residual
bureaucrats apprehensive about their jobs; while most of them were aroused
and angry at the idea of considering their former rayas 'infidel' Christian
subjects as co-equals. Moreover, Adana and its environs were those rare
spots that had escaped the massacres and devastations of the 1894-96
Abdul Hamit era. This fact, plus the relative affluence of the indigenous
Armenian population, served to render them a suitable target for
annihilation at a propitious moment.
Thus, cupidity, status anxieties, religious dogmas, and occasional
displays by the victims' bravado, were factors converging at a level of
conflict that served to produce the pogroms. Superseding all of these
factors was the actual organization of the bloodbath. It involved mainly the
cooperation of the governmental functionaries with Ottoman military
authorities who made ample use of the local garrison arsenals. In the
aftermath of the massacres, however, the Ottoman government publicly and
officially exonerated the Armenians, thereby implicitly recognizing their
victim status.29 Moreover, during an interpellation in the Ottoman Chamber
of Deputies, which is also known as the Lower House of the Ottoman
Parliament, Grand Vizier Hilmi Papa scorned "the reactionary, criminal
scoundrels who were bent on massacring and plundering the Armenians
through a surprise attack."3 Local tribunals and military courts-martial
altogether convicted and executed 124 Turks-all of them minor officials
and haphazard individual perpetrators-on the gallows in the period
29. TAKVIMI VEKAYI (Turk.), July 31, 1909 (publishing the ministerial circular announcing
the blamelessness of the Armenians who were described as "devoted and loyal" citizens).
30. 2 V.H. PAPAZYAN, (ARMENIAN DEPUTY IN THE CHAMBER), IM HUSHERE [MY
MEMOIRS] 118 (1952).
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between May 28/June 10, 1909, and November 30/December 13, 1910. To
mollify Muslim sentiment, seven Armenians were also hanged.
Two salient points about this episode merit discussion. First of all, there
is the matter of the degree of the Armenians' vulnerability as the victim
group. As stated above, the 1909 Adana Holocaust had two stages. The first
one proved more or less abortive for the assaulting forces. Anticipating the
eventuality of the onslaught, several hundred young Armenians had secured
arms and devised a self-defense strategy. As a result, they not only warded
off attacks and protected the larger populations residing in the Armenian
wards of the city of Adana, but in the process they exacted heavy tolls from
the assaulting forces. This fact demonstrates the viability of deterrence or
mitigation through organized self-defense for groups targeted by inexorable
foes for destruction.
There are also limits to such defensive undertakings. Having
experienced a depletion of their resources for armed resistance, and in a
condition of utmost exhaustion, the Armenians wearily consented to disarm
for a truce arranged by the British consul at nearby Mersin. In the
meantime, new contingents of the Turkish army had arrived ostensibly to
restore "peace and order." What followed was one of the most gruesome
and savage bloodbaths ever recorded in human history. Enraged by the
magnitude of the losses they sustained during the first round of the
conflagration, the Turks--directly supported by the newly-arrived army
contingents--descended upon the totally disarmed and defenseless
Armenians, butchering and burning them alive by the thousands. Schools,
hospitals, and churches--overcrowded with despairing multitudes seeking
refuge in them-were especially selected for this purpose. The
overwhelming majority of some 22,000 Armenian victims of the 1909
Adana Holocaust died at this second stage of the perpetration of the mass
murder.
Second, the internal vulnerability of the victim population was
compounded by the external vulnerability factor. The warships of seven
nations-England, France, Italy, Austria, Russia, Germany, and the United
States-had streamed into the waters near Adana's port city of Mersin.
They consisted mostly of cruisers and frigates, along with their regular
complements of combat sailors ready for action. None of them were ordered
to intervene inasmuch as the victims were Ottoman subjects and outside the
pale of their protective duties. The non-materialization of the anticipated--
yet feared-foreign intervention was not only a great relief to the
perpetrators but also served as an incentive to renew the carnage with even
greater ferocity. This failure of external deterrence only served to amplify
the vulnerability of the targeted group as it considerably emboldened the
perpetrator group. This critical fact underscores the dysfunctional aspects of
the principle of humanitarian intervention. The naval forces of the Powers
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failed to intervene for a variety of reasons, chief among which were the
following:
1. There was no concrete agreement to act jointly.
2. Each Power was anxious to protect its own nationals trapped in
the conflagration, including consular personnel.
3. Mutual suspicions of imperial and/or colonial designs on a
decaying empire stifled the will for unilateral initiative on the
part of any Powers.
4. The abruptness of the outbreak of the bloodbath astounded the
governments of these Powers, denying them the possibility to
clearly define the situation and work out a response. They were,
in a sense, paralyzed by confusion and uncertainty.
The net result of all this was that the commanders and the naval forces at
their disposal, comprising this formidable international armada, were
reduced to the ignominious role of spectators of the 1909 Adana Holocaust.
More significantly, the top leadership strata involved in the decision-
making and organization of this holocaust almost completely escaped
punitive justice.
The rise of the Ittihadists and the ultimate decision to "liquidate" the
Armenians
The transition to a new Turkish regime through a bloodless revolution
that deposed Sultan Abdul Hamit and installed the Ittihadists-namely the
Young Turks-in July of 1908, only compounded the problems of domestic
conflict in general and the Turko-Armenian conflict in particular. Though
their regime (1908-18) was dubbed the Second Era of the Constitution, the
Young Turk Ittihad leaders-like their predecessor Abdul Hamit ("the Red
Sultan")--embraced violent measures against the minorities on whose
behalf the Powers had again begun to intercede. Their policy of repression
helped spark the 1912 Balkan War and later played a role in the adoption of
nationalist policies that plunged Turkey into World War I. As noted, British
historian John A. R. Mariott stated:
The Young Turk revolution brought matters to a head. [That
undertaking] was in fact a last effort of the Moslem minority3 to
retain its ascendancy in the face of growing resistance on the part of
31. In 1910, the British Foreign Office estimated that as a national rather than religious
group, "the Turkish element only number[s] some six million in an Empire of thirty million.
Under a real constitutional regime it would be swamped, more especially as it is inferior to the
majority in intelligence, instruction, and business qualities. It can only maintain its position by the
army and by the method [of repression]." FO 424/250, TURKEY, ANNUAL REPORT 1910, at 4.
Turkish statesman and editor H.C. Yal~in confirms the view of the numerical minority of the
Turks in the Ottoman Empire while deploring it as fact. Hfiseyin Cahit Yalqin, I YAKIN
TARIHIMIZ 214 (1962).
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subject races and impending European intervention. The revival of
the constitution was little more than an ingenious device for
appeasing Liberal sentiment abroad while furnishing a pretext for
the abrogation of the historic rights of the Christian nationalities at
home.32
At the 1910 annual Ittihadist Congress at Saloniki, the secret discussion
outside the formal sittings revolved around the plan for the coercive
homogenization of Turkey, which was euphemistically called "the complete
Ottomanization of all Turkish subjects."33 British Ambassador Gerard
Lowther observed that "[t]o them 'Ottoman' evidently means 'Turk' and
their present policy of 'Ottomanization' is one of pounding the non-Turkish
elements in a Turkish mortar."34 When assessing these decisions in a report,
the British Foreign Office employed the words "to level"-to eliminate-
with the forecast that "the Young Turks will endeavor to extend the
'levelling' system to the Kurds and the Arabs."35 In a series of reports based
on "authentic documents" furnished by confidential sources, the French
Consul at Saloniki informed his Foreign Ministry in Paris that the Young
Turks decided to employ force and violence, including massacres, as a last
resort for the resolution of nationality conflicts.36
A final clue to understanding this pattern of repudiation regarding the
ideas of social and political reform is found in a secret speech by Taldt, who
was simultaneously the preeminent Young Turk leader and Interior
Minister. He delivered the speech to a conclave of top Ittihad leaders
32. Supra note 12, at 443-44.
33. FO 195/2359, fol. 276.
34. Doc. No. 181, Sept. 6, 1910, Report, in 9 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR
1889-1914, pt. 1, at 207 (Gooch & Temperley eds., 1926) [hereinafter BRITISH DOCUMENTS].
35. FO 424/250, supra note 31, at 4.
36. M. CHOUBLIER, LA QUESTION D'ORIENT DEPUIS LE TRAITt DE BERLIN (1897). In his
November 15, 1910, report, quoting Halil-the head of the parliamentary branch of the party
comprising Ittihadist deputies-Consul Choublier mentions the proposal of relying "solely on
military might" in order to deal with the nationalities. 7 N. S. TURQUIE POLITIQUE INTERIEURE,
JEUNES TURCS 149 [hereinafter N. S. TURQUIE]. In his November 16 report, the Consul revealed
the existence of a divergence of opinion among Ottoman authorities as to the choice between
"deportation" and "massacre" in handling the problem of Macedonia and the Bulgarians in
Adrianople (Edirne). Id. at 150. According to the highly confidential information supplied to him
in the November 16, 1910, report, the Monastir branch of the party opted for the deportation to
Asiatic Turkey of parts of the Christian population of Macedonia to be supplanted by Muslim
refugees, whereas the Adrianople branch opted for the massacre of the resident Christian
population (1'6xtermination de tous les chriftiens hostiles a la jeune Turquie) should the
implementing of large bodies of Muslim immigrants fail to attain the desired results. In the
November 17 report, he speaks of the resolve of Ittihad to resort to "la force des armes" if efforts
"to achieve peacefully the unity of Turkey should fail ... for which purpose we should develop
the patriotism of the Turks." Id. at 151. All these disclosures are confirmed by the Dean of
Turkish historians who stated that, weary of the protracted Turko-Armenian conflict, Ittihad
would turn to the army to resolve the conflict by force of arms. 2 Y. BAYUR, TURK INKILABI
TARIHI [THE HISTORY OF THE TURKISH REVOLUTION] 13 (1952).
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assembled in Saloniki in August of 1910 for a pre-Congress strategy
meeting. Austrian, French, and British intelligence sources in that city
confirmed both the occurrence of this meeting and the authenticity of the
text of the speech. The British Vice Consul at Monastir, Arthur Geary,
vouched for "the accurate reproduction of the gist of Tal~t's discourse" as it
was obtained from "an unimpeachable source." The relevant portion of that
speech reads:
You are aware that by the terms of the Constitution equality of
Mussulman and Ghiaur [infidel, a derogatory label applied to non-
Muslims] was affirmed but you one and all know and feel that this
is an unrealizable ideal. The Sheriat [the religious laws of Islam],
our whole past history and the sentiments of hundreds of thousands
of Mussulmans and even the sentiments of the Ghiaurs themselves
... present an impenetrable barrier to the establishment of real
equality .... There can, therefore, be no question of equality until
we have succeeded in our task of Ottomanizing the empire.37
The homogenous Ottoman society Taldt envisioned as a precondition for
real equality the required liquidation in one form or another of the existing
heterogeneous elements. In confirming the authenticity of that speech, a
fourth source, a French diplomat, spoke of the Ittihad resolve to d~raciner
'deracinate,' or uproot the bases of nationalistic tendencies to "deform" the
nationalities themselves."
37. BRITISH DOCUMENTS, supra note 34, at 208. Confirmation of the speech is in Austrian
Vice Consul von Zitkovsky's No. 69 "secret" report of October 14, 1910, in 12 A.A. TORKEI 159,
No. 2, A186643. French confirmation is in N.S. TURQUIE, supra note 36, at 92-97. A particular
additional phrase in this French version, not found in the British report, is Taldt's proposal to lull
the potential victims of the Ottomanization program to complacency: "il faut que nous
tranquillisions nos voisins." This report is stamped "received" by the Direction Politique et
Commerciale of the French Foreign Ministry, bearing the symbols D. Carton 391, and the date
August 6, 1910, indicating that it was wired on the very same day on which the speech was
delivered.
38. This source was the French Chargd at distant Hidjaz in Arabia, who was reporting to
Pichon, the French Foreign Minister. N.S. TURQUIE, Jan. 26, 1911.
Two prominent Turkish sociologists both confirm and explain the inevitability of this
decision of Ittihad to resort to the violent elimination of non-Turkish nationalities. One concluded
that Ittihad meant to "[assimilate them] through coercive methods, if necessary." A. YALMAN,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN TURKEY AS MEASURED BY ITS PRESS 101 (1914). The other, the
high priest of Ittihad ideology, traced the lingering nationality conflicts to the introduction of
statutory public laws, equating Muslims with non-Muslims. In a rarely publicized internal party
document written during the World War I genocide against the Armenians and bearing the title:
"The Two Mistakes of Tanzimat," ideologue Ziya Gokalp lambasted the 1839 and 1856 reform
edicts. Declaring them serious mistakes, he reasserted the concept of milleti hakime 'the nation of
overlords' with the watchword: "Islam mandates domination." According to the author of the
book in which this document was published for the first time in 1949, the document was in the
possession of Ittihad party Secretary-General Midhat $Ukru Bleda. K. DURU, ZIYA GOKALP 60-69
(1949) (Turk.). Another author has revealed that Gokalp wrote this essay for the benefit of the
Ittihadist leaders, to whom they were then distributed at the party's 1916 convention. ZIYA
GOKALP, TURKISH NATIONALISM AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION 319 n.6 (Niyazi Berkes ed., trans.
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Within a year of taking power, the Young Turks introduced a number of
constitutional changes and laws purporting to liberalize the regime.
Although promulgated through the Parliament, these changes brought no
relief to the minorities. In the Balkans-particularly Macedonia and
Albania, in the eastern provinces with large concentrations of Armenians,
and even in distant Yemen--Ottoman misrule deteriorated into bloody
oppression. With the exception of the Armenians, the subject nationalities
resorted to open rebellion. Many of these rebellions were successful, and
the Empire suffered further shrinkage of its territories as a result.
THE TURKISH MILITARY DEFEATS IN THE 1912 BALKAN WAR AND THE
ACCENTUATION OF THE EASTERN QUESTION
The historical background of the Balkan War
In terms of its origin and outcome, this war had a profound effect upon
the Young Turk Ittihadist leadership as it grappled with the task of
maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which was in danger of
disintegration through centrifugal forces. The Balkan Peninsula emerged as
the main theater on which these forces exerted themselves, effectively
challenging the sovereign authority of the Ottoman state. In other words,
the nationality question--or more specifically the Eastern Question-
became a crucible for the survival of the empire. Equally important, to the
extent that the Armenian Question had become an extension of the Eastern
Question, the Turko-Armenian conflict functioned as an integral part of that
crucible, or test case, for the preservation of the empire.
The disastrous outcome of the 1912 Balkan War, however, left the very
survival of that empire hanging in the balance. The attempt of the
Armenians to revive the thorny Armenian reform question at this critical
juncture of Ottoman history, with all that it portended for the Turks, served
to arouse the ire and fury of despondent Ittihadists, thereby further
intensifying the already simmering Turko-Arnenian conflict. The ground
was prepared for the Turks to redefine the Armenian Question as an
ominous variant of the Eastern Question, warranting drastic and pre-
emptive measures in order to avert a total disaster. To understand these
developments more fully, a brief historical review of the events surrounding
the 1912 Balkan War is in order.
The rising tide of nationalism in Europe and elsewhere had certain roots
that were independent from any experience of foreign or colonial
domination but were nevertheless susceptible to being reinforced by such
1959). In explaining the ideological grounds for adopting this new policy, an American expert on
modem Turkey states that Ittihad "soon turned from equality and Ottomanization to
Turkification[.] . . ." Roderic Davison, The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914, 53:3 AM. HIST. REV.
481,482-83 (1948).
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experiences. The nationalism that was beginning to blossom in the Balkans
was substantially influenced by the legacy of the French Revolution, which
consecrated the twin ideals of liberty and nationality. Nor can one disregard
the impetus that the Great Powers inadvertently provided in this regard in
their pursuit of aggrandizement, riches, and hegemony. The efforts of
Napoleon III stand out in this context. As a measure of spite against the
Hapsburg Empire, he encouraged the spread of nationalism among the
Balkan nationalities. With England-and later Germany-merely playing
the role of the more or less disinterested and benevolent mediators, Russia
assumed a predominant role in due time. Ethnic and religious affinities, on
the one hand, and an eye on the big prize, Constantinople, on the other,
energized that role.
Nevertheless, Russia had some grounds for bitterness that drove her to
engage in some disruptive behavior. Through the maneuvers of Austria and
Germany-and especially England-her spectacular victories in the 1877-
78 Russo-Turkish War were reduced to insignificance at the July meeting of
the 1878 Berlin Congress. The ensuing Berlin Treaty contained many of the
seeds of discontent that animated the Serbian, Bulgarian, and Macedonian
nationalists to play a major role in the precipitation of the subsequent 1912
Balkan War.
At that Congress, Bosnia and Herzegovina were handed over to Austria,
thereby angering the Serbs. The Serbs lost Nis and Mitrovitza and were cut
off from their kinsmen, the Montenegrins, through the loss of Novibazar-
of which the Austrian military occupation was sanctioned by the Congress.
Furthermore, the Three Emperors' League, involving Germany, Austria,
and Russia-established in 1881 and renewed for three years in 1884-
granted Austria the right to annex the dual provinces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina whenever she deemed it opportune. The terms of the Berlin
Treaty were considered even more damaging to Bulgarian interests and
aspirations, as the territories granted to her by the 1878 San Stefano
Treaty-the forerunner of the Berlin Treaty-were reduced by two-thirds.
Moreover, she had lost Macedonia and was cut off from the Aegean Sea.
Pro-Russian Montenegro likewise sustained territorial losses, including a
strip of Bosnia. Perhaps most importantly, Russia had to acquiesce in the
Berlin Congress to the imposition by the other Powers of all these terms
under a very real threat of war from Austria and England.
In substituting the Berlin Treaty for that of San Stefano, the Powers
were once more outlining and solidifying their notion of humanitarian
intervention, while zealously guarding their own national interests. At issue
were the nationality conflicts subsumed under both the Eastern Question
and the Armenian Question. The San Stefano Treaty was virtually dictated
by victorious Russia to the defeated Turks-who had sued for peace-and
thus had a bilateral character. The terms of both the 1856 Paris Peace Treaty
The Armenian Genocide
and the 1871 London Agreement, however, stipulated that any change in
the terms involved respecting the status of Turkey, including her borders,
could not be valid without the collective assent of all the Powers-England,
Russia, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.
In 1870, Russia had repudiated the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of
Paris, and the Powers, while grudgingly accepting this Russian fait
accompli, declared their stand against unilateral breaches of international
agreements. The same San Stefano Treaty's Article 16 had made the
departure of Russian troops from "the Armenian provinces" in eastern
Turkey contingent on the actual implementation of the reforms provided in
that article. In the substitute Berlin Treaty, however, that article was
sufficiently diluted to render it inoperative. This was done by acceding to
the Turkish demand to let her assume responsibility for the implementation
of the reforms she had committed to undertake, without the presence of
Russian occupation troops, who eventually left as a result.
The projected reforms not only failed to materialize, but the Ottoman
authorities embarked upon a deliberate campaign of massacre and
repression to reduce the issue of reform to irrelevance. Consequently,
Macedonia-which under Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty was guaranteed
similar reforms-together with Armenia became a testing ground for
Turkish defiance of treaty obligations and Turkish resolve to obviate, if not
eliminate, the Macedonian and Armenian Questions. This was to be
accomplished through a new wave of persecutions, as well as by way of
decimating the native populations involved through a series of massacres
and compulsory demographic changes-including the importation of large
numbers of Muslim refugees into the Balkans for resettlement purposes.
Through Articles 23 and 61, the Berlin Treaty of 1878 thus emerged as
the immediate nexus, the acute connecting link, between the Eastern
Question and the Armenian Question. It highlighted their convergence in
the processes through which the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
gradually emerged and crystallized itself, with Russia emerging as its chief
champion. In order to stymie this Russian penchant for unilateral
protectionism, the Powers, led by England, supplanted that doctrine by
insisting on the need for collective engagement on the part of the Concert of
Europe. The objection of the Powers rested on the argument that they all
had a stake in the improvement of the conditions of the nationalities seeking
reform and deliverance from Ottoman dominion. Therefore, they
maintained, no single Power was entitled to monopolize this overall
humanitarian concern for remedies.
When one examines the relationship between the terms of the
settlement incorporated into the Berlin Treaty and the 1912 Balkan War,
one cannot help but observe again the dysfunctional, if not
counterproductive, aspects of the humanitarian intervention principle. The
No. 1]
158 UNIV. OFST THOMAS JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLICPOLICY [Vol. V
Powers managed to agree among themselves and reach a modicum of
consensus, but in the process generated a treaty that was pregnant with
inevitable future conflict among the peoples on whom its terms were
imposed as a humanitarian service. Macedonia was a major source of such
conflict. Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece had conflicting claims inasmuch as
that province was almost entirely populated by Greeks and Serbs, but also
Bulgarians. The severity with which the Young Turk Ittihadist regime
began to forcibly denude Macedonia of its indigenous Christian population
and repopulate it with Muslim migrants was such as to alarm and agitate
these three nationalities, which all began exploring the possibility of an
alliance primarily against Turkey. As described in note 36, the Ittihadists
had already resolved-during the secret meetings of their 1910 annual
Congress-to resort to massacre, if necessary, to cleanse Macedonia of
Christians.
The first initiative for an alliance came from the Serbs approaching the
Bulgarians with whom they had fought and lost a war in 1885. The Serbs
were angry about the loss of Bosnia, which Austria finally had
incorporated-as allowed in the Three Emperors' League agreement-in
the wake of the 1908 Young Turk revolution. At the same time, Bulgaria
had almost simultaneously proclaimed her complete independence,
repudiating the existing arrangement of Ottoman suzerainty. Likewise,
angry at the Turkish policy of extermination in Macedonia, the Russophile
Bulgarian Premier not only responded favorably to the Serbian overture,
after some initial hesitation, but proposed an even wider Balkan alliance.
The outbreak and outcome of the First Balkan War
The Serbo-Bulgar Pact was first forged under the guidance and
sponsorship of Russia within the space of two months during the year of
1912. It had a secret annex providing for a common action against
Turkey-subject to Russian approval-in the event of a threat of war or an
outbreak, such as a massacre. This pact was followed by a Greco-Bulgar
alliance, supplemented by a military convention, and joined by
Montenegro. The resulting Balkan League, disguised as a defensive
alliance, was an instrument designed to pounce at an opportune moment on
a foe that for centuries had oppressed the subject peoples in the Balkan
Peninsula, and whose expulsion from Europe was presently held to be
warranted once and for all.39
The Serbo-Bulgar Pact also provided for the rearrangement of the
39. On the formation of the Balkan League and the associated wars see GOOCH, supra note
22, at 500-10; A. J. GRANT & H. TEMPERLEY, EUROPE IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH
CENTURIES (1789-1950), at 375-80 (6th ed. London 1962); C. SEYMOUR, THE DIPLOMATIC
BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 1870-1914, at 221-39 (1927); R. SONTAG, EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY 1871 -1932, at 176-82 (1933); W. S. DAVIS, THE ROOTS OF THE WAR 426-43 (1918).
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boundaries of the two countries by an eventual partition of Macedonia to
which, as noted above, both countries had respective claims. To enhance the
significance of the treaty, the sovereigns of the two states, in addition to the
ministers, signed it. Apart from aspirations that she entertained with respect
to Macedonia, Serbia was a tiny, land-locked state when compared to a
relatively aggrandized Bulgaria, and she had high hopes of creating the
nucleus of a future Yugoslav Empire.
As if to accommodate the zeal of the partners of the new Balkan
coalition, the Ottoman regime was not long in providing the opportunity for
these partners to go collectively into offensive action-preceded by the
dispatch to Turkey of unacceptable ultimatums. That opportunity involved
the twin massacres perpetrated by the Turks in the summer of 1912. One
massacre took place in the town of Ishtib, east of Skopje, and the other and
major one in Kogani, southeast of Skopje-the capital city of Kosovo
province in Macedonia. The bloodbaths aroused the people of Bulgaria and
galvanized the governments of the Balkan Alliance, which, led by tiny
Montenegro, proceeded to carry out the projected war against Turkey.
The intercession by the Powers-first through efforts of persuasion and
subsequently through a warning to the effect that no territorial conquest
would be recognized by any of the partners of the coalition-was of no
avail. For their part, Turkish masses led by Ittihadist leaders and university
students launched a series of noisy militant demonstrations in the streets of
Istanbul, defiantly insulting their former subjects and chanting in unison:
"We want war, war, war." They also shouted such battle cries as "To Sofia,
to Sofia," "Down with Greece! Greeks, bow your heads," and some other
unprintable epithets directed at both Greeks and Bulgarians. Equally
significant, the university students kept screaming, "Down with Article 23,
down [with] it" when confronting Grand Vizier and veteran Army
Commander Ahmed Muhtar Papa-in whose presence some of the students
went so far as to cry out, "Down with equality ... we don't want equality,"
referring to the central provision of Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty,
stipulating reforms to benefit the downtrodden Christian subjects. With an
inclination to underscore the religious dimensions of the escalating
conflicts, other demonstrators shouted, "The Balkan dogs are tramping on
Islam," "They are insulting an empire which is adorned with victories
amassed in the course of six centuries, and which can crush that pack of dog
lice with a single blow of the heel."
As if to publicly confirm the interconnectedness of Articles 23 and 61
of the Berlin Treaty and their nearly identical ramifications for Turkey,
Tanin-the semi-official mouthpiece of Ittihad--declared in an editorial:
Who can guarantee that Article 61 will not follow Article 23, which
Article they presently want to resuscitate. Europe's intervention and
Europe's desire to control our internal affairs is a warning to us to
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ponder the fate not only of Rumelia [Macedonia], but also eastern
Turkey for it will be impossible to spare eastern Turkey the fate
awaiting Rumelia.40
Similar meetings and demonstrations were taking place in Sofia,
Belgrade, and Athens-where bellicosity and clamors for war were no less
pronounced. There was a sense of self-righteousness in these gatherings,
which Bulgarian Premier I. E. Gueshof articulated as follows: "The present
war in which the Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbians, Catholic Albanians and
Orthodox Montenegrins will fight hand in hand, is not a product of
panslavist agitation. It is a crusade against unbearable Turkish tyranny that
is exploiting and martyrizing the Christians of the Balkan [P]eninsula."'
In less than three weeks, that crusade harnessed a series of spectacular
military victories, with each of the three major partners of the coalition
displaying inordinate martial prowess on the battlefields. The redoubtable
Ottoman army suffered humiliating defeats that were as unexpected as
devastating. Under General Savof, the Bulgarians scored a series of
victories in the battles of Ktrkkilise in Thrace and Luleburgaz, forcing the
Turks into full retreat. In the process they reached the outskirts of
Adrianople (Edirne) and the gates of Istanbul at Qatalca.
The Serbs were equally, if not more, successful. On October 18, Serb
King Peter issued a proclamation to his troops declaring that the object of
the Balkan League was to liberate Macedonia and bring liberty, fraternity,
and equality to the Christian and Muslim Serbs, as well as to the Albanians
with whom the Serbs had coexisted for thirteen centuries. The 150,000 man
Serbian army was first victorious at Novibazar-the district out of which
the Turks were cleared. A portion of that army subsequently occupied
Pristina. The main part of that army began to march toward Jsktib (Skopje)
in Macedonia, the ancient capital of the Serbs. The Turks blocked the way
by occupying Kumanovo. There the two armies met, and after three days of
fierce fighting between October 22 and October 24, 1912, the Serbs scored
a complete victory. Two days later, the Turks were forced to yield Uskib.
The triumphant entry in that ancient Serbian capital marked a historical
milestone for the Serbs, who for five hundred years had waited for the day
to avenge their defeat at the hands of the Turks in the June 15, 1389, Battle
of Kossovo Polye. It was a defeat that had sealed the fate of the Serbs for
five centuries, many of whom had sought refuge in the mountains of
Montenegro to continually wage war against the Turks ever since that time.
Many more had migrated to Bosnia. In quick succession, the Serbs had
become the masters of Novibazar, Old Serbia, western Macedonia, and the
40. 3 A. ANDONIAN, BADGERAZART UNTARTZAG BADMOOTUN BALKANIAN BADERAZMIN
[COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OFTHE BALKAN WAR] 499 (1912) (Turk.).
41. Id. at 503.
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Albanian coast of Durazzo on the Adriatic Sea.
Similar victories were scored by the Greeks, who entered Saloniki on
November 3, 1912, after three days of combat in Yenice. In the second
round of the Balkan War, which started on February 3, 1913, the Bulgarians
and Serbs finally captured the ancient Ottoman capital of Adrianople. On
March 6, the Greeks won a phenomenal victory at Janine with the fall of
this almost impregnable fortress. The Greeks captured 200 guns and the
33,000 soldiers of the garrison.
The conduct of the Powers in the face of these Balkan coalition
victories was significant in several respects, but was critical in one respect.
The critical component centered on the rise of acute dissension in its ranks
and the formation of two types of alignments counterpoised to each other.
This splitting foreshadowed, in a sense, the establishment among the Great
Powers of the two enemy camps prevalent at the outbreak of the war-the
Entente Powers, consisting of England, France, and Russia, and the Central
Powers, consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Even though
these Powers-especially Austria-Hungary and Russia-had warned
Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece that they would be denied the
right to appropriate the lands they might conquer in the war, they now were
in disagreement about this issue. Sympathetic from the very start with the
cause of the coalition, Russia suggested that the conquered territories
belonged to the victors by right of occupation and should be partitioned
among them by way of friendly agreement. British opinion was almost
unanimous on the side of the allies of the coalition. On November 9, 1912,
Prime Minister Herbert Asquith declared that the Powers would recognize
accomplished feats and would not oppose the recognition of the territorial
changes achieved through military victory.
The Central Powers, on the other hand, demurred and resisted such
accommodation. A particular bone of contention was Serbia's retention of
Durezzo, which afforded her access to the Adriatic Sea. The Entente
Powers were willing to support Serbia's stance, but it was opposed by Italy
and especially Austria, which was willing to wage war for the Adriatic
because she considered it her sole preserve. In the interest of an
autonomous Albania, Austria-Hungary pressured Serbia and Montenegro to
surrender Scutari (I~kodra), which had been captured during the war.
The Balkan League was f6rmed under the auspices of the Russian Tsar.
It essentially revolved around Serbia, which had become Russia's outpost in
the Balkans. The League did not last long, however, as the Serbs and
Greeks were forced to reunite against Bulgaria, which had made a mockery
of the coalition by her twin surprise attacks against Serbia and Greece.
Reportedly engineered by the Bulgarian Commander-in-Chief, General
Savof, without the knowledge of the Cabinet and Premier Gueshof, the
initiative backfired at great cost to Bulgaria. This war of partition between
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the former allies began in June and ended on July 29, 1913.
In the meantime, Austria-Hungary and Russia had resorted to partial
mobilization, with Russia amassing troops on the Caucasian frontier and
informing Turkey that she could not promise neutrality if the war in the
Balkans started again. Germany sternly let it be known that an attack on
Turkey might trigger an all-out European war. One of the consequences of
the military defeats sustained by Turkey was that the Central Powers,
especially Germany, became most apprehensive about the design of Russia
and her Slavic client-states in the Balkans.
This is the context in which the Powers, after much haggling, combined
their influence in 1913-14 to persuade Turkey to agree to a set of Armenian
reforms for which the Armenians had been clamoring for decades. Three
elements in this undertaking rendered the February 8, 1914, Reform
Agreement explosive. It was initiated by the Russians-the mortal enemies
of the Turks-and coincided with one of the worst moments of Ottoman-
Turkish history. Finally, the Powers impelled, if not compelled, the Turks to
accede to it.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE BALKAN WARS: THE DISSOLUTION OF THE
EASTERN QUESTION INTO THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AND ITS OMINOUS
PORTENTS
The Armenians' vulnerability magnified
As one student of the Young Turks observed, the Albanians, Greeks,
and the different Slavic nationalities in the Balkans had emancipated
themselves one by one from Ottoman dominion, and by 1913, "only the
Armenians and Arabs remained as subject nationalities."4 Since the Arabs
42. FEROZ AHMAD, THE YOUNG TURKS 154 (1969). In one particular respect the Armenians
stood out among all the subject nationalities, such as the Albanians and various Arab groups-the
Yemenis, Syrians, Lebanese, and Jordanians. The Armenians avoided militancy and confrontation,
consistently seeking remedies through appeals and pleas which were always suffused with pledges
of unswerving loyalty. The Balkan nationalities and the Arabs, on the other hand, resorted to
rebellion in order to end Ottoman subjugation and the attendant repression. The Armenians were
characterized by Ottoman rulers as milleti sadika 'the loyal nation,' for this display of fidelity,
SADI KOQA$ TARIH BOYUNCA ERMENILER VE TURK-ERMENI ILLISKILERI [THE ARMENIANS
THROUGHOUT HISTORY AND TURKO-ARMENIAN RELATIONS] 59, 61 (1967) (Turk.). Their
subsequent transformation from loyal servants of the State into its militant opponents is, however,
an example of the futility of entreaties and pleas applied to regimes thriving on oppression and
tyranny. In a meeting with British Ambassador Sir Henry Elliot on December 6, 1876, Patriarch
Nercess Varjabedian, the duly recognized religious head of the Armenians, expressed the hope
that the impending Constantinople Conference would not urge the Porte to accord certain
privileges to the rebel provinces (Serbs, Bulgars, Montenegrins) and to deny the same to the loyal
ones (the Armenians). The Ambassador demurred, saying that the purpose of the Conference was
not to scrutinize the entire Administration of Turkey, but rather to secure peace and tranquility in
those provinces where revolts were threatening the general peace. The Patriarch retorted that if
rebellion were a prerequisite for enlisting the support of European Powers, then there would be no
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were far more numerous, inhabited areas that were peripheral to the
heartland of the empire, and perhaps most significantly, were of Muslim
faith, the Turks turned their combative attention to the Armenians as a
residual minority of primary importance. Their catastrophic experiences in
the first Balkan War of 1912 not only shocked them, but also informed
them of the potential perils mistreated nationalities could bring to bear on
the Empire. As a result of that Balkan War catastrophe, Turkey had lost
nearly 70 percent of her European population and about 85 percent of her
European territory. The streets, mosques, and other communal places of
abode in Istanbul were full of destitute and emaciated Muslims who had
fled the war zones or were dislocated as a result of Greek, Serb, and
Bulgarian territorial conquests in the former Ottoman provinces of the
Balkans. It was against this overall backdrop of misery and despair that the
Armenian leadership once again chose to launch its campaign for Armenian
reforms inside and outside Turkey, mobilizing prominent diplomats,
clergymen, and public figures in Russia and Europe. From a Turkish point
of view, however, this was a time of deep anguish, grim reflection, taking
stock, and new, drastic initiatives for remedies in pursuit of national
redemption.
Halil (Mentee)-President of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies and
Foreign Minister in World War I-openly lamented the losses in the
Balkans and in 1914 declared in Parliament: "I exhort my nation from this
eminent podium that it should not forget [the tragedy in the Balkans]
(shouts of 'we won't forget').... We have on the other side of our borders
brothers to be freed. . . . Only thus can we protect our future from the
dangers of repeating the mistakes which led to our defeats and tragedies. 43
One major conclusion the Ittihadists derived from their reflection was
that the renewal of the Armenian pursuit of reforms, if successful, had all
the potential of becoming an extension of the Balkan disaster in eastern
Turkey-with far graver consequences for the future of Turkey. Abdullah
Cevdet, one of the original pillars of Ittihadist ideology, as well as a
military physician, veteran publicist, and exponent of the drive for
Westernization in Turkey, linked his lamentations for the losses in the
Balkans to his apprehensions of greater potential dangers in Asiatic Turkey:
"Will these thunderous roars on our European borders, these blows, awaken
us? ... Don't kid yourself that because of our preoccupations in European
Turkey, we should not worry about Anatolia. Anatolia is the well spring of
every fibre of our life. It is our heart, head, and the air we breathe."'
The implicit message contained in this statement is clear: beware of the
difficulty whatsoever in organizing a movement of that nature. FO 424/46, No. 116, Dec 7, 1867.
43. 3 TARIK ZAFER TUNAYA, TURKIYEDE SIYASI PARTILER [THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN
TURKEY] 465 (2d enlarged ed. 1984).
44. Id. at 463.
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Armenians and their clamors for reform to be introduced in the heart of our
fatherland. For the Turks, it was not easy to forget that the Balkan
nationalities' attainment of complete freedom and independence was
traceable to the rudimentary demands for reform that eventually involved
some form of autonomy. Projecting into the future any kind of autonomy in
any scheme of reforms was defined by the Ittihadist leaders as a non plus
ultra for Turkey.
As if to exacerbate the situation, several other factors entered the
picture. The resumption of the campaign for Armenian reforms occurred
during the critical months of the fall of 1912, when Turkey was suffering
setbacks externally-such as the Balkan War military defeats-and
internally when Ittihad temporarily was forced out of power. Moreover, a
number of non-Turkish members of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies,
including Greeks and Armenians, were becoming more vocal about their
criticism of Turkish nationality policies in Europe and Asiatic Turkey. In
the meantime, the deposed Sultan Abdul Hamit chided the Ittihadist leaders
as misguided patriots for allowing non-Muslims such scope for dissidence
and opposition, which critically undermined Turkish national interests. This
Turkish exacerbation reached its apex by the most crucial factor at work
throughout the entire episode. The Armenian reforms movement was
spearheaded by the Russians who now had become the defenders-if not
champions-of the Armenian cause, reversing their policy of tacit support
for the massacres prevalent in the 1890s. Through their persistence and
willingness to address the concerns of the Turks and their German
advocates, the Russians finally succeeded in overcoming the obstacles
created by Turkish methods of stalling and temporizing. On February 8,
1914, the Armenian Reform Agreement, reflecting a hard-won consensus
by the Powers that had been grudgingly approved by Turkey, was signed in
Istanbul as an international law document akin to a treaty. The most critical
and consequential feature of the Agreement was a provision for two foreign
inspectors-general to administer and superintend the projected reforms, a
provision which alarmed and offended the Turks while inspiring and
relieving the Armenians.4 5 The Turkish intent to derail the implementation
of the Agreement, however, was evident in the resentment of many
Ittihadist leaders regarding the collective pressures they felt the Powers had
utilized to influence Turkey to sign the Agreement. These Powers had
succeeded in ironing out their differences through the forging of a more or
less united front, mainly through the active engagement of Russia and
Germany, as well as by impelling Turkey to accommodate. The lasting
effects of this resentment were manifest at the outbreak of World War I,
45. W. I. van der Dussen, The Westenenk File. The Question of Armenian Reforms in 1913-
1914, 39 ARMENIAN REV. 1 (1986).
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when several Ittihadist leaders, including party boss Taldt, openly berated
and vilified the Armenian leaders for resuscitating the reform issue at the
most painful and vulnerable moment of Turkish history. This resentment
gave way to rage when these same Ittihadists made reference to the fact that
the Armenians had dared to seek and obtain foreign intervention on their
behalf. The more blunt Ittihadists are reported to have gleefully reminded
some of the Armenian leaders on their way to liquidation during the World
War I genocide that 5'imdi intikam zaman idir '[t]his is our moment of
settling scores.'46
The adoption of a radical Turkish ideology
Parallel to the projections of a potential Armenian threat to the integrity
of the Turkish state, the Young Turk Ittihadists embarked upon a
comprehensive program of national renewal and political reorientation. One
aspect of this undertaking was the vehemence with which Ittihad proceeded
to deal with dissidents from within and opponents from without the party.
There was a prevailing sense among the party leaders that the recent
misfortunes befalling Turkey were largely due to their "mistake" of having
allowed their political and military antagonists to challenge the party and its
leaders. Several prominent party members bitterly opposed to the party had
resigned from it to form the Freedom and Accord Party (Hiirriyet ve Itilij)
in November of 1911 and were anticipating the downfall of Ittihad. This
new party of liberals included non-Muslims in its ranks-especially
Armenians-whose essential common objective was the overthrow of the
Ittihadist regime.
In addition, there was the active opposition of the Savior Officers
(Haldskar) group, which had close ties to the abovementioned Freedom and
Accord Party. Their objective was the demolition of the Ittihadist power
structure, the disengagement of military officers from the vagaries of
politics, and the restoration of a "legal government." Through a variety of
pressures, which culminated in an ultimatum demanding the dissolution of
the Ottoman Parliament, they managed to oust Ittihad from power in July of
1912. These initiatives coincided with the reigniting of the Macedonian
crisis and the subsequent outbreak of the Balkan War, ultimately giving rise
to a general conviction that the rift among the Turkish military-pitting
Ittihadist against anti-Ittihadist officers-in no small way contributed to the
defeat suffered.by the Ottoman army.
The Ittihadist program of national renewal essentially aimed at
discarding the traditional concept of multi-ethnic "Ottomanism"-which
was based on the premise of concord among the various nationalities-as
46. The testimony of Ottoman Civil Inspector and Ittihadist sympathizer Mihran Boyadjian,
the French version of which is in Renaissance, June 25, 1919.
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useless and even pernicious. This concept was predicated upon the
assumption that the other ethnic elements would eventually integrate
themselves in the Ottoman system, and would relinquish most of their
ethnic ties, with the temporary exception of their religions. This assumption
proved not only illusory but ill-advised because it implied eventual
assimilation-a condition that was abhorrent to these nationalities.
Ottomanism was, therefore, to be dismantled and replaced by a narrowly
conceived nationalism, glorifying "Turkism" and seeking the
"Turkification" of the entire fabric of Ottoman society. With this turn of
events, the rudimentary liberal ideals of the Young Turk Ittihadist
Revolution were doomed to be relinquished or repudiated.
The main instrument for this radical change was the Ittihadist Party, the
Committee of Union and Progress, relying as it did on its organization and
hierarchy of leadership, including its covert designs and submerged
structures. Top priority was given to the task of creating a vast network of
party branches in the provinces to be directed by trusted party loyalists.
They were to be entrusted with party secrets and the execution of party
directives independent from, and sometimes in contradiction to, officially
stated policies. These measures of party penetration and expansion were
applied most resolutely in those provinces of Anatolia and eastern Turkey
in which there were large clusters of Armenians. As it turned out, the
principal aim of the entire undertaking was to gradually gain control over
these populations, emasculate them further through legal-political
constrictors, and create a general atmosphere of anti-Armenianism among
the Muslim multitudes in these provinces. In the 1910 secret speech of
Taldt, alluded to above, there was already a provision included for this type
of party build-up and secrecy of certain party designs, about which even
regular civilian functionaries in the Ottoman provincial administration were
to be kept incognito.47
Consistent with the thrust of these administrative initiatives, Ittihad, in
the very midst of Turkish military reverses in the 1912 Balkan War,
launched a comprehensive program of indoctrination and paramilitary
training of Turkish youth. Ittihad had tried to inculcate a new mood of
nationalism and militancy among the young generation committed to its
care. The Association for the Promotion of Turkish Strength (Tfirk Giicii
Cemiyeti), established in 1913, in its Number 1 Statute, speaks of the need
for "military training [of the youth] to enable the nation to become again a
warrior (silah~or) nation" in order to avert Tiirk irk l inhitata 'the decay of
the Turkish race.' Additionally, there were a number of Ottoman youth
groups that, under the direction of the War Ministry, were to be prepared
"for the defense of the fatherland" and for whose purpose "the ministry is to
47. Supra, notes 36-37.
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supply, free of charge, rifles, bullets, and ammunition."48
These activities were directed by Ittihadist War Minister Enver and
chief Ittihadist ideologue Ziya Gdkalp. Both leaders were indicted by the
post-war Turkish Military Tribunal investigating the wartime Armenian
massacres, and Enver was convicted and sentenced to death. The League
for National Defense (Miidafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti), established in the midst
of the Balkan War, had the mission to prepare the Turks for combat, despite
its disinterest in political and party involvements and its profession for such
other ancillary ends as peace, prosperity, and happiness. These professions
were belied by the subsequent activities of the League. Equally important,
the founders of the League included the top leaders of Ittihad, who were
also Cabinet Ministers named Interior Minister Taldt, War Minister Enver,
Foreign Minister Said Halim, Marine Minister Cemal, and Justice Minister
Ibrahim.49
The military initiatives
Given the preeminent role of the military officers in the outbreak of the
Ittihadist Revolution and the general sway of militarism in the unfolding of
the career of the Ottoman Empire, the military functioned as the backbone
of the party organization in launching these initiatives. As a first step, the
officer corps of the armed forces was purged inexorably. Ittihadist War
Minister Enver abruptly dismissed a total of 1100 officers from all ranks,
including generals who were considered incompetent and less than loyal to,
or outright opponents of, Ittihad." Concomitantly, the same War Minister
promoted young, trusted Ittihadist officers, including himself, to much
higher ranks than normal procedure would allow. The net result of these
undertakings was the optimal politicization of the officer corps and the
swift ascendancy of Ittihadist zealots in all ranks.
Under the auspices of the same War Minister, and in close cooperation
with the Supreme Directorate of the Talat factions, the Turks reactivated
and enlarged the Special Organization. A quasi-military outfit led by
regular army officers, this organization in its nuclear form was already
active in the 1913 Second Balkan War. It mainly conducted guerrilla
operations against the Bulgarians. As publicly stated, a vital part of its
assigned task was surveillance and "neutralization" of internal foes. Its
secret mission was to liquidate the discordant and "alien" minorities at the
first opportunity, which were major threats to Turkish national security, as
evidenced later in the war as the Armenians headed this list of minorities.
The party directorate, in close cooperation with the Public Security
48. TUNAYA, supra note 43, at 297.
49. Id. at 294-95.
50. LIMAN VON SANDERS, FIVE YEARS IN TURKEY 8 (1927).
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Office (Emniyeti Umumiye) of the Interior Ministry, set up a special
department of surveillance and intelligence in the General Directorate of
Turkish Police. This department housed the secret files compiled on
Armenian clerical, political, and educational leaders, as well as journalists
and intellectuals against whom warrants for future action existed.
A number of members of the League of National Defense enrolled in
the ranks of the Special Organization, which served as the principal
instrument in the implementation of the Armenian Genocide. These Special
Organization contingents were led by such highly committed and prominent
Ittihadist military officers as Yakub Cemil, Halil (Kut), and Yenibahgeli
Nail, who were heavily implicated in the subsequent wartime planning and
direction of the massacres against the Armenians. They simply transferred
the skills they had acquired as guerrilla leaders in the Balkans5 to their new
field of operations involving the extermination of the bulk of the Armenian
population in Turkey during World War I.
The successful achievement of that objective was in line with the
objectives of the new nationalism of the Ittihadists, which centered on
radically restructuring Ottoman society by way of converting a
heterogeneous social system into a more or less homogeneous one-the
optimal Turkification of a residual empire.
THE CONDITIONS OF INITIATING THE GENOCIDE
Contrary to some views being advanced in recent times, the World
War I genocide against the Armenians was not simply an aberration due to
wartime exigencies. The 1894-96 Abdul Hamit era and the subsequent
1909 Young Turk Ittihadist era Armenian massacres not only constitute the
antecedents of that genocide, but given the conditions surrounding them,
the latter genocide is rather ominously foreshadowed in this chain of
massacres. Within such a historical perspective, there is a discernible
Ottoman-Turkish pattern where resort to wholesale massacres emerges as
an integral part of the policy respecting the treatment of minorities
considered to be discordant and troublesome for the state.
Although the Armenian massacres preceding World War I were
significant in many respects, they underscored two especially important
facts. First, the massacres were not subjected to the test of viable criminal
proceedings, either nationally or internationally. The resulting impunity
accorded to the perpetrators became a form of negative reward. Second, as a
result, no deterrence materialized in anticipation of the 1915 genocide.
Current international law on genocide revolves around the twin principles
of prevention and punishment. The examination of the special case of the
51. PASA HALIL & TAYLAN SORGUN, BITMEYEN SAVA$ [THE UNENDING FIGHT] 125 (1972)
(Turk.); TUNAYA, supra note 43, at 123, 275, 294.
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Armenian Genocide, in which both of these principles failed to operate,
brings into question the reliability and adequacy of international law52 and,
accordingly, the efficacy of international efforts to deter genocide.
Evidence suggests that Turkey's entry into World War I was
substantially influenced by a desire to seize a suitable opportunity to finally
resolve all lingering domestic conflicts, especially the Armenian Question.
The recent literature analyzing the problems of genocide is replete with
discussions recognizing this historical fact. Several of these discussions
singled out the 1894-96 Abdul Hamit era massacres as a historical
antecedent of contemporary issues of genocide,53 while others focused on
52. The classification of genocide as a crime under international law in the U.N. Convention
on Genocide poses a number of difficulties in current international jurisprudence, where the
doctrine of state sovereignty still remains powerful. While a variety of new principles,
conventions, and covenants have emerged in the post-Nuremberg period and provided some help
in this arena-especially those involving the twin ad hoc tribunals that prosecuted the respective
crimes in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda-these difficulties remain substantial.
The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was
established at The Hague in 1994 pursuant to Security Council Resolution No. 827.
Several convictions for the crimes against humanity have been handed down,
including for the crimes of rape and enslavement. On August 2, 2001, Trial
Chamber I of the Tribunal rendered the first judgement convicting an individual of
having committed the crime of genocide. General Radislav Krstid was sentenced to
forty-six years of imprisonment for his involvement in genocide, forced transfer and
deportation committed between July and November 1995, in particular for his
responsibility for the crimes committed by Serbian forces in the town of Srebrenica.
On November 23, 2001, the U.N. Tribunal indicted Slobodan Milosevic for
committing genocide against the Bosnian people. His trial for crimes against
humanity committed during the Serbian crackdown on ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
and during the war in Bosnia and Croatia opened in February 2002. He is the first
head of state to stand trial for genocide.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established in 1995 at
Arusha, Tanzania, pursuant to Security Council Resolution No. 955. On September
2, 1998, the first verdict interpreting the Genocide Convention was handed down by
the Arusha Tribunal in the judgement against Jean-Paul Akayesu, who was held
guilty on nine counts for his role in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.
Alfred de Zayas, The Twentieth Century's First Genocide: International Law, Impunity, the Right
to Reparations, and the Ethnic Cleansing Against the Armenians 1915-16, in ETHNIC CLEANSING
IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE 166 (Steven Bdla Virdy & T. Hunt Tooley eds., 2003).
It is only recently that the crime of genocide has even been considered a crime under
international law. As Willis states:
Not until 1948 would genocide... be clearly defined as an international crime, and
in 1919 adherence to time-honored notions of sovereignty placed limitations upon
the scope of traditional laws and customs of war. The Hague conventions . .. [did
not deal] with a state's treatment of its own citizens. . . From this perspective,
Turkish action against Armenians was an internal matter, not subject to the
jurisdiction of another government.
JAMES WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR
CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 157 (1982). As indicated in this study, this deference to
state sovereignty was ever-present in the international reaction to the Armenian Genocide. See the
exchange between U.S. Secretary of State Lansing and President Wilson during World War I, in
GEORGE, supra note 15, at Introduction.
53. See A. Jacoby, Genocide, 4 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT (4 REVU
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the World War I massacres. 4
The opportunity factor
When World War I broke out in July of 1914, Turkey was neither
prepared militarily, nor disposed to commit herself instantly and
unconditionally to the camp of the Central Powers led by Imperial
Germany. Sympathies for Germany among the most powerful leaders of
Ittihad, such as War Minister Ismail Enver, some of his close associates in
the ministry, and Dr. Naztm-the shadowy arch power-wielder in the
supreme directorate of the party-were pervasive. Several factors
additionally favored the adoption of a pro-German Turkish stance.
Foremost among these was German Emperor Wilhelm II's legacy of
diplomatic support of Sultan Abdul Hamit's regime at a time when most of
the other Powers of the Concert of Europe were against the wholesale
Armenian massacres carried out under the aegis of the regime they had
condemned. Moreover, it was an Ottoman tradition to entrust the
reorganization and rebuilding of the Ottoman army mainly to German
officers, among whom Helmuth von Moltke and Baron Colmar v.d. Goltz
stand out. Perhaps most importantly, the Ittihadists' first major move after
they overthrew their opponents' government in January of 1913 was to seek
German military assistance in reorganizing the Ottoman army, which was
then directly under Enver's control. Enver's sympathies for the Germans
bordered on exaltation of Germany as a formidable military machine that he
had an opportunity to observe and assess when serving in Berlin as Turkish
Military Attach6 prior to World War I. Following the signing of a contract,
the arrival of a German Military Mission to the Ottoman capital of Turkey
in December of 1913 foreshadowed the Turkish intent to forge a partnership
with Germany. That partnership materialized on August 2, 1914, when the
Turko-German political and military alliance was signed, following a series
of stringent negotiations whereby the Turks secured German commitment
PtNALE SUISSE) 472 (1979) (Ger.); Cervantes Rio, Etude sur l'Article 175 du Code Pdnal
Mexicain "Genocide," 16-17 ETUDES INTERNATIONALES DE PSYCO-SOCIOLOGIE CRIMINELLE 52
(1969) (Fr.).
54. See ANTONIO PFLANZER, LE CRIME DE GENOCIDE 15, 18, 20 (1956); THE UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 25, 45 (1948) [hereinafter WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION]; SHARVASH TORIGUIAN, THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2d ed. 1988); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CASE W. INT'L
L.J. 201, 210 (1979); Arthur K. Kuhn, The Genocide Convention and State Rights, 43 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 498, 501 (1949); Josef L. Kunz, The United Nations Convention on Genocide, 43 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 738, 741 (1949); Rafal Lemkin, Genocide: A New International Crime: Punishment and
Prevention, 10 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 367 (1946); Egon Schwelb, Crimes
Against Humanity, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178, 181-82, 198 (1946); Kurt Stillschweig, Das
Abkommen zur Bekiimpfung von Genocide, 3 DIE FRIEDENSWARTE FOR ZWISCHENSTAATLICHE
ORGANISATION 97, 99 (1949) (Ger.).
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for massive monetary and other types of economic assistance to Turkey.55
The dividends of this alliance for the unfolding of Turkish designs and
aspirations were multifarious. First and foremost, Germany now offered a
protective shield to Ittihad's wartime plans. Internally, the centerpiece of
these plans was the homogenization of the ethnic make-up of what was left
of the Ottoman Empire. As later events demonstrated by explicit and strict
orders from the German High Command in Berlin, the multitudes of
German officers who were affiliated with the German Military Mission to
Turkey were forbidden from intervening in the process of Armenian
deportations. The same prohibition applied to the thousands of other
German officers assisting in the Turkish war effort, whether as
commanders-in-combat or as administrative support personnel. This order
was rationalized by twin arguments. First, unconditional support of the
Turkish ally for the sake of a common victory in a war for survival was to
be regarded as a matter that should take precedence over everything else.
Second, Germany could ill-afford to ignore "Turkish sensitivities" with
regard to the Armenian issue. This policy of non-intervention was approved
at the highest level of the German government and sanctioned by the
Kaiser. In fact, in a lengthy report made to Berlin on April 15, 1915,
German Ambassador Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim declared that by
intervening in "a hopeless case (aussichtslose Sache), i.e., the Armenian
problem, we may jeopardize interests which are more important and crucial
for us." 56
Apart from these attitudes of indulging the Turks and thereby granting
them a laissez faire license, German intelligence operatives helped the
Ittihadists to set up a surveillance bureau within the General Police
Directorate in the Ottoman capital. As noted above, the purpose was to
prepare lists and dossiers on Armenian community leaders to be treated as
potential foes of Turkey. Furthermore, upon German advice, War Minister
Enver reactivated and expanded the residual Te~kilat i Mahilsa 'Special
Organization' as an instrument of wartime agitation, sabotage, and murder
both inside and outside Turkey.
Thus, taking advantage of the crisis generated by the outbreak of the
war in July of 1914, the general mobilization in the wake of the signing of
the Turko-German alliance, and the endemic state of siege together with the
corollary martial law, the Turkish authorities proceeded to prepare the
ground for the holocaust-to-come, while energetically preparing themselves
for preemptive war. The opportunity was not only at hand, but also was
considerably maximized.
55. For a detailed discussion of the circumstances under which this pact was signed see
BAYUR, supra note 36, vol. 2:4, at 629-647.
56. A.A. TORKEI 183/36, A13922, R14085.
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In his memoirs, Major-General Joseph Pomiankowski, the Austro-
Hungarian Military Plenipotentiary attached to the Ottoman General
Headquarters during the War, alluded to the unabated antagonism between
Muslim and non-Muslim nationalities. Referring to "the spontaneous
utterances of many intelligent Turks," Pomiankowski conveyed their view
that these conquered peoples ought to have been forcibly converted to Islam
or "ought to have been exterminated (ausrotten) long ago."57 His conclusion
is noteworthy:
In this sense there is no doubt that the Young Turk government
already before the war had decided to utilize the next opportunity
for rectifying at least in part this mistake. . . . It is also very
probable that this consideration, i.e., the intent, had a very important
influence upon the decisions of the Ottoman government relative to
joining the Central Powers, and upon the determination of the exact
time of their intervening in the war.58
Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, whose contacts with high-ranking
Young Turk officials were more frequent and intimate than
Pomiankowski's, was even more explicit in this regard:
The conditions of the war gave to the Turkish Government its
longed-for opportunity to lay hold of the Armenians. . . . They
criticized their ancestors for neglecting to destroy or convert the
Christian races to Mohammedanism at the time when they first
subjugated them. Now... they thought the time opportune to make
good the oversight of their ancestors in the 15th century. They
concluded that once they had carried out their plan, the Great
Powers would find themselves before an accomplished fact and that
their crime would be condoned, as was done in the case of the
massacres of 1895-96, when the Great Powers did not even
reprimand the Sultan.59
Morgenthau's opinion was unequivocally confirmed by the Young
Turk party leader Mehmet Taldt, one of his chief sources in Turkish
government circles. Taldt told Dr. Johann Mordtman, the man in charge of
the Armenian desk and the dragoman at the German Embassy at Istanbul,
that Turkey was "intent on taking advantage of the war in order to
thoroughly liquidate its internal foes, i.e., the indigenous Christians,
57. JOSEPH POMIANKOWSKI, DER ZUSAMMENBRUCH DES OTroMANISCHEN REICHES, 162
(1969) (Ger.).
58. Id.
59. Henry Morgenthau, The Greatest Horror in History, 9 RED CROSS MAGAZINE (Mar.
1918). Louis Heck, the U.S. High Commissioner in Istanbul and a Special Assistant of the
Department of State, also pointed out the opportunity factor provided by World War 1: "[T]he
Young Turk Government soon availed itself of the opportunity afforded by war conditions to try
to exterminate the Armenian population of Asia Minor and thus rid itself once for all of the
'Armenian [Q]uestion."' FO 371/3658/75852. Folio 441, at 2 (May 19, 1919).
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without being thereby disturbed by foreign intervention."6 In a joint
memorandum to Berlin requesting the removal of German Ambassador
Metternich on account of the envoy's unceasing efforts to intercede on
behalf of the Armenians, Talt-along with warlord Enver-reemphasized
this point: "[T]he work must be done now: after the war it will be too
late."'"
The observations of two prominent German experts also merit special
attention. In explaining Turkey's motivation for entering World War I on
the side of Germany, K. Ziemke-a renowned German political scientist-
described Turkey's desire to extricate herself from the bondage of the
Armenian Reform Agreement of January 26/February 8, 1914, initiated in
the wake of the 1912 Balkan War, as a contributing factor. He recognized
the massacre and destruction of "one million Armenians" during the war as
"the radical solution" of the Armenian Question, delivering Turkey from
the burden of all future vexations. By so doing, the Turkish Government
eliminated the conditions for future reform projects, as well as the allied
pressures.62 More significantly, a German officer serving as Vice Consul of
60. The Tal~t statement is in German Ambassador Wangenheim's June 17, 1915, report to
his chancellor in Berlin, A.A. TORKEI 183/37, A19744, R14086. The same Talat in a Cabinet
meeting in the fall of 1915, when the anti-Armenian exterminations campaign had all but run its
course, is reported to have declared that he was aiming at the creation of a solidly Turkish nation,
cleansed from alien elements, so that the Powers would have no more cause to intervene in the
internal affairs of Turkey. A.A. TORKEI 159, No.2, v. 14, Charg6 Baron von Neurath's November
5, 1915, report to Berlin.
These judgments are confirmed by Ernst Jackh, the German expert on Turkey who
undertook several inspection trips to Turkey during the war, relaying his conversations with high
ranking Turkish officials and his observations to Kaiser Wilhelm 11 at his headquarters, the
German Chamber of Deputies, and the Foreign Office. In his twenty-two page report covering his
September-October 1915 trip he stated, "Indeed Talfit openly hailed the destruction of the
Armenian people as a political relief..... A.A. TORKEI 158/14, p. 18 (Oct. 17, 1915). Another
German author, the last German Ambassador to Turkey in World War I, commented in his
memoirs: "When I kept on pestering him [Taldt] on the Armenian Question, he once said with a
smile, 'What on earth do you want? The question is settled. There are no more Armenians."' The
ambassador later explained this assertion of having solved the Armenian Question in terms of the
ancestral territories of the victims, namely, "Armenia where the Turks have been systematically
trying to exterminate the Christian population." Despite his expressions of esteem for Talat, the
ambassador conceded Taldt's role in that extermination: "[H]is complicity in the Armenian crime
he atoned for by his death." MEMOIRS OF COUNT BERNSTORFF, 176, 180, 374 (Eric Sutton trans.,
1934). All of these admissions and testimonies are confirmed by a Turkish newspaper that was
able to gain access to a pile of secret documents hidden in a suitcase, which was found and
impounded by the Turkish judicial police during a raid at the home of attorney-at-law Ramiz, the
brother-in-law of Dr. B. Sakir. In its December 14, 1918, issue, Sabah, the newspaper in question,
concluded that "Talfit has ordered the extermination of the Armenians."
61. ULRICH TRUMPENER, GERMANY AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 127 (1968).
62. KURT ZIEMKE, DIE NEUE TURKEI 1914-1929, at 271-72 (1930). The French text of the
February 8, 1914, Agreement is in ANDRE M. MANDELSTAM, LE SORT DE L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN
236-38 (1917). Another German author who defined the Turkish conflict with the Armenians as a
struggle for self-preservation and hence indirectly justified the resort to radical measures,
characterized the Armenian reforms as dynamite-a nauseating medicine for the Turks cast in the
role of a patient. FRIEDRICH NAUMANN, ASIA 132 (1911). In this context, Naumann advanced the
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Erzerum, where a large Armenian population was destroyed, informed
Berlin that "the Armenian [Q]uestion which for decades occupied the
attention of Europe's diplomats is to be solved in the course of the present
war[.] ... [M]easures undertaken by the Turkish government ... are
tantamount to the total destruction of the Armenians. '"63
This view is further corroborated by the sources within the Ittihadist
regime itself. Ahmet Cemal Papa, who served both as a member of the
Young Turk triumvirate running the Ittihadist regime from 1908-18 and
also as the Commander of the Fourth Army and Marine Minister during the
war, states in his memoirs that "our sole objective (bizim yegane gayemiz)
was to free ourselves from all the governmental measures [imposed upon
us] in this war and which constituted a blow to our internal
independence."'  These shackles involved the international stipulations on
the autonomy of Lebanon and the Armenian reform agreement-signed on
February 8, 1914, by Turkey and Russia with the concurrence of the other
Powers. As Cemal stated, "We wanted to tear up that Agreement."65 Enver,
also a member of the ruling Ittihad triumvirate, likewise denounced the
reforms stipulated by the international Agreement of February 8, 1914.
During an exchange on August 6, 1915, with Hans Humann-German
naval attachd and Enver's childhood friend-the Minister admitted that the
view that given the Islamic tenets of Ottoman theocracy, there should be allowance made for the
Turks exercising barbarisches Naturrecht, 'the natural law of barbarism.' Id.
63. A.A. TORKEI 183/39, A28584 (Aug. 10, 1915, report by Dr. Max von Scheubner
Richter); see also JOHANNES LEPSIUS, DEUTSCHLAND UND ARMENIEN 1914-1918, at 123-24
(1919) (Ger.).
64. CEMAL PA$A, HATIRALAR 438 (1977).
In the September-December 1913 period, during which the Armenians were again
pressing for reform to be executed under European control, Ahmet Cemal repeatedly threatened
the Armenian leaders with massacres through "the Muslim populations of six provinces" that were
targeted for reforms. The threat was made to Vartkes, one of the Armenian Deputies serving in the
Ottoman Parliament. Being an ardent Ittihadist, Vartkes-who was also a nationalist Dashnak
leader-was advised to inform his party of this threat, warning against further solicitation of
European intervention. ARMEN KARO, ABRUADZ ORER [LIVED DAYS] 191-92 (1948). This threat
was confirmed by K. Zohrab, another Armenian deputy and professor of international law at
Istanbul's law school. In his pre-World War I secret diary, Zohrab in anticipation of the genocide,
called attention to Cemal's threat. Krikor Zohrab, Zohrabee Orakroutiuni Yegernee Nakhoriageen
[K. Zohrab's Diary on the Eve of the Genocide], VII NAVASART (Armenian Monthly, Los
Angeles, C.A.), Apr. 1989, at 21. Both Vartkes and Zohrab were arrested and summarily killed by
agents of the Turkish Special Organization during the war.
In December of 1913, Cemal had several Armenian students arrested for leading the
festivities celebrating the 1500th anniversary of the invention of the Armenian alphabet. When
exhorting them to stop their "traitorous activities," Cemal again threatened to "exterminate the
Armenians, sparing neither infants nor the old." L. MOZIAN, AKSORAGANEE MU VOTISAGANU:
SEV OREROU HISHADAGNER [AN EXILE'S ODYSSEY: MEMORIES OF DARK DAYS] 9-10 (1958).
Cemal's threat is further confirmed by another Armenian deputy of the Ottoman Parliament, who
along with five other Dashnak leaders, had met Cemal in a private session after dinner in Prinkipo
(Biyukada) Island. Cemal repeated his threat at that meeting. PAPAZYAN, supra note 30, at 191-
92.
65. PASA, supra note 64, at 438.
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main rationale of the anti-Armenian measures was "the total elimination of
any basis" for future interventions by the Powers on the behalf of the
Armenians.66 As a departmental head in the Turkish Justice Ministry
declared, "There is no room for Armenians and Turks in our state, and it
would be irresponsible and thoughtless for us if we didn't take advantage of
this opportunity [afforded by the war] to do away with [the Armenians]
thoroughly. 
6 7
The annulment of the treaties
Through the December 3/16, 1914, Imperial Rescript, the Agreement of
February 8, 1914, was cancelled.68 Talt, then Interior Minister, justified
66. A.A. KONSTANTINOPEL 170, folio 52; LEPSIUS, supra note 63, at 122. In a report to
Berlin on February 2, 1915, German Ambassador Wangenheim stated that pursuant to Article 5 of
the contract-signed with 2 Inspectors-General-the Turkish government had the right to cancel
that contact. A.A. TURKEI 183/36, A5043, R14085. According to a Turkish historian, the contract
was signed on May 25, 1914, and provided for a monthly salary of four hundred Turkish gold
pounds, plus a supplementary allocation for lodging. 4 ISMAIL HAMI DANI$MEND,
IZAHLLOSMANLL TARIHI KRONOLOJISI [THE ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY OF OTTOMAN HISTORY]
409 (2d ed. 1961). These conditions are described in the July 1, 1914, issue of the official
Ottoman gazette, Takvimi Vekdyi.
67. JOHANNES LEPSIus, DER TODESGANG DES ARMENISCHEN VOLKES 230 (1930). In an
interview with the Director of Talfit's Hususi Kalem 'Special Bureau,' Hasan Fehmi, journalist
von Tyszka (Harry Stuermer) touched on the then ongoing anti-Armenian campaign. Fehmi, who
had studied in Vienna, was fluent in German, and had translated German writer Goethe's Egmont
into Turkish, responded as follows: "We must get rid of the Armenians. They have a revengeful
and irreconcilable attitude and, as they are brave, they constitute a danger to the state .... We
must make a clean sweep of the Armenians (reinen Tisch machen)." A.A. TORKEI 183/37,
A25593, R14088 (Sept. 30, 1915, report).
68. Gotthard Jschke, Das Osmanische Reich von Berliner Kongress bis zu seinem Ende
(1878-1920/22), in 6 HANDBUCH DER EUROPAISCHEN GESCHICHTE 543, 545-46 n. 36 (1968).
See also BAYUR, supra note 36, vol. 3:3, at 12; FO 371/2116/56207 (Sept. 23, 1914) (British
Ambassador Mallet's report to Grey).
The cancellation coincided with the termination of the contract of the two inspectors-a
Dutchman L.C. Westenenk, Assistant Resident in the Dutch East Indies, and a Norwegian Nicolai
Hoff, Major and later Lieutenant Colonel in the Norwegian Army and the Secretary General of the
Norwegian Ministry of War-who were to implement the reforms. However, as historian Arnold
Toynbee pointed out, the two Inspectors' mission was intentionally handicapped by the Turkish
authorities so as to derail and abolish it at an opportune moment:
A clause was inserted in the Inspectors contract of engagement, empowering the
Government to denounce it at any moment upon payment of an indemnity of one
year's salary-a flat violation of the ten years' term provided for under the scheme;
and the list of 'superior officials' was inflated until the patronage of the Inspectors,
which next to their irrevocability, would have been their most effective power, was
reduced to an illusion. The unfortunate nominees were spared the farce of exercising
their maimed authority. They had barely reached their provinces when the European
War broke out, and the Government promptly denounced the contracts and
suspended the Scheme of Reforms, as the first step towards its own intervention in
the conflict. Thus, at the close of 1914, the Armenians found themselves in the same
position as in 1883. The measures designed for their security had fallen through, and
left nothing behind but the resentment of the Government that still held them at its
mercy. The deportations of 1915 followed as inexorably from the Balkan War and
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this move by declaring to Dr. Mordtman, "C'est le seul moment propice. "69
the Project [Agreement] of 1914 as the massacres of 1895-96 had followed from the
Russian War and the Project of 1878 [Berlin Treaty].
ARNOLD TOYNBEE & JAMES (VISCOUNT) BRYCE, THE TREATMENT OF ARMENIANS IN THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1915-16, at 635-36 (Ara Sarafian ed., uncensored ed. 2000). See also
AUSTRIAN POLITICAL OFFICE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARCHIVES, 12 Tirkei, Karton 463. In Austrian
Ambassador Pallavicini's May 16, 1914, report, he informed Vienna that "many of the
competences agreed upon by the Powers were not included in the contract," and in his May 25,
1914, report he complained that the two Inspectors were being treated as subordinate civil servants
under the authority of the Turkish government, not as European Inspectors General. In his diary,
Westenenk quoted Taldt as describing Hoff and him as "just officials," with Hoff repeatedly
expressing doubt about the seriousness of the Turkish rulers. See L.C. Westenenk, Diary
Concerning the Armenian Reforms in 1913-1914, 39 ARMENIAN REV., Spring 1986, at 29, 46, 57,
69, 72. Interior Minister and Party Chief Taldt's two appointments were revealing in this respect,
portending as they did ominous developments for the Armenians. Diyarbekir Deputy Aziz Feyzi
and his brother-in-law Bitlis province Governor Mustafa Abdulhalik (Renda) were assigned to the
staff of Hoff as Deputies. Both men were subsequently to play pivotal roles in the destruction of
the largest concentration of Armenians in southeastern and eastern Turkey, involving the
provinces of Diyarbekir and Bitlis. Abdtilhalik was later assigned to the post of Governor-General
of Aleppo province, directing the ancillary liquidation of the remnants of the Armenian population
who had survived the exacting forced trek from the interior of Turkey to the deserts of
Mesopotamia in 1915-16. A.A. TORKEI 183/38, A24658 (Enclosure VI of Aug. 20, 1915, report
R14087). ZHAMANAG (Turk.), 6/19 July 1914, describes the other, i.e., Abdalhalik's assignment,
whose complicity in the Armenian Genocide is sketched in Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Naim-
Andonian Documents on the World War One Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians-The
Anatomy of a Genocide, 18 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 311,336-38, 342 (1986).
Interior Minister Taldt's highhanded breaches of the February 8 Reform Agreement,
transacted under the guise of a contract with the two European Inspectors-General, were
challenged by Boghos Nubar in a protest letter to German Deputy Foreign Minister Arthur
Zimmerman on June 22, 1914. In it, Nubar, who in 1912 had been appointed by the Catholicos of
all Armenians in Russian Armenia to revive and pursue the outstanding problem of Armenian
Reforms in Europe, pointed out that the stipulations of the Reform Act were grossly violated by
the provisions of the related contract. As an international agreement, the Act had precedence over
an internal contract, and the Turkish government, it was claimed, had no legal basis to circumvent
that Act. Nubar was mainly objecting to the willful reduction of the international status of the
European inspectors to that of mere Ottoman functionaries whereby they would lose their power
of control over the administration of the Reform Act, as well as their ten year tenure set forth in
that Act. He warned Zimmerman that should the Turks be allowed to get away with these
breaches, the reforms would once more prove moribund. A.A. BOTSCHAFT KONSTANTINOPEL,
168, A12314.
The protest was an exercise in futility. Long before World War I broke out, Talst let the
Armenian leaders know that they were wasting their time, and that under no circumstances would
Turkey allow European or any foreign control of the provincial administration. He told an
Armenian Parliament deputy: "Don't you realize that there are a thousand ways to derail the
reforms in the course of their implementations?" PAPAZYAN, supra note 30, at 235-36. Talst's
Turkish biographer confirmed this obstructive stance of the Ittihadist party boss who avowedly
was biding his time to dismantle the whole plan. TEVFIK (AVDAR, TALAT PA$A 308-11 (1984).
In his memoirs, an Armenian political executioner assigned by the Dashnak party to
duties involving the "avenging" of the crimes perpetrated against the Armenians by assassinating
the arch perpetrators, claims to have encountered a Turkish agent sent to the prison to spy on him
and establish his true identity. Hasan Burhaneddin, the agent, reportedly was induced to confess
that he was assigned to the task of assassinating one of the two Inspectors in Romania. K.
MERDJANOF, EEM GUDAGU [MY TESTAMENT] 28-29 (1972).
69. A.A. TORKEI 183/36, A504, R14085 (Ambassador Wangenheim's Feb. 2, 1915, report to
The Armenian Genocide
This reflected a general determination during the war to abrogate the
international treaties that had resulted from the application of the
"humanitarian intervention" principle. On September 5, 1916, Ottoman
Foreign Minister (Mentee) Halil informed German Ambassador Count
Paul Wolff-Metternich that "the Ottoman Cabinet had decided to declare
null and void the Paris Treaty of 1878." "7 As Halil explained, "All three of
these international treaties had imposed 'political shackles' on the Ottoman
state which the Porte intended to be rid of."'" It is important to note that
Richard von Kiihlmann, the German Ambassador at Istanbul, pointed to the
relationship between the Armenian reform movement and the imposition of
these "shackles" on Turkey-especially the February 8, 1914, Reform
Berlin). The use of the word "propitious" is significant because it reveals a frame of mind geared
to the incidence of a suitable opportunity to proceed with the execution of a plan. In his account of
the existence of such a plan, another Armenian deputy of the Ottoman Parliament relates Taldt's
vehement reaction to the Reform Act and all that is implied by it. He quotes Talfit as declaring:
Don't Armenians realize that the implementation of the reforms depends on us; we
shall not listen to the proposals the Inspectors may put forward[.] . . . [T]he
Armenians are trying to create a new Bulgaria. They don't seem to have learned
their lessons; all initiatives opposed by us are bound to fail. Let the Armenians wait,
opportunities will certainly come our way too. Turkey belongs only to the Turks.
Kegham Der Garabedianee, Kegham Der Garabedianee Vugayutounu [The Testimony of Kegham
Der Garabedian] in GARO SASSOUNi, BADMOUTIUN DARONEE ACHKHAREE [HISTORY OF
DARON] 838-39 (1957). This watchword, "Turkey for the Turks," was the standard rationale on
which other Ittihadist leaders based their campaign against the Armenians. Dr. Nazim, a cohort of
Talht, is reported to have declared, "[T]he Ottoman state must be exclusively Turkish. The
presence of foreign elements is a pretext for European intervention. They [the foreign elements]
should be forcibly Turkicized." Ren6 Pinon, La liquidation de l'Empire Ottoman, 53 REVUE DES
DEUX MONDES 128, 131 (Sept. 1919).
70. TRUMPENER, supra note 58, at 134-35.
71. Id. On the same day, Halil departed to Berlin to seek German support for the annulments.
In informing his government of this move in his September 5, 1916, report, German Ambassador
Metternich directed attention to the Turkish concern for Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty involving
Turkey's "engagements for Armenia," and to Halil's justification of the act on grounds of
Kriegszustand 'the effect of war.' A.A. TORKEI, 183/44, A24061, R14093. The full text of the
repudiation of the treaties in German is in Friedrich Edler von Kraelitz-Greifenhorst, Die
Ungfiltigkeitserklarung des Pariser und Berliner Vertrages durch die Osmanische Regierung, 43
OSTERREICHISCHE MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEN ORIENT 56-60 (1917) (Ger.), where Halil
predicated his abrogation of the Paris and Berlin Treaties on the following main arguments: (1)
The Paris Treaty provisions proscribing interference in the internal affairs of Turkey were violated
through some of the provisions of the Berlin Treaty. (2) While the Ottoman Empire scrupulously
adhered to the two treaties, Italy, England, France, and Russia repeatedly violated them. (3)
France coerced Turkey to illegally grant limited autonomy to Lebanon. Moreover, the provisions
of the autonomy were not part of any international treaty or agreement, but rather were internal
administrative adjustments. Hence, they could be revoked and canceled. (4) Russia blatantly
violated the Paris Treaty by acts of agitation in the Balkan provinces, an aggressive war against
Turkey, a series of interventions in the internal affairs of Turkey, and by illegally subverting the
status of the Black Sea port city of Batum. (5) The present conditions have altered the situation in
that Turkey was no longer under the Powers' tutelage, and as a totally independent state, could act
with all the rights and privileges conferred upon such a state. (6) This new situation justified the
conclusion that the two treaties forfeited their right to exist. For the English text of Halil's
statements, see Current History (N.Y. Times monthly publication), 5 Feb. 1917.
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Agreement-as a condition justifying the ensuing genocide. Reviewing the
history of the Turko-Armenian conflict, on February 16, 1917-six months
before he became Foreign Minister-Kiihlmann traced "the destruction of
the Armenians which has been carried out on a large scale, and was based
on a policy of extermination" to "Armenian reform endeavors, especially
those launched during the 1912 Balkan [W]ar. ' 72
The Allies' warning and the introduction of the principle of "Crimes
Against Humanity"
As the genocide was beginning, the Allies issued a joint declaration on
May 24, 1915, condemning "the connivance and often assistance of
Ottoman authorities" in the massacres. "In view of these new crimes of
Turkey against humanity and civilization," the declaration continued:
"[T]he Allied governments announce publicly . . . that they will hold
personally responsible ... all the members of the Ottoman government and
72. A.A. TURKEI 183/46. A5919, R14095. In his memoirs, Talat confirms this Turkish
reaction to renewed Armenian reform efforts. TALAT PASANIN, HATIRALARL 50-55 (E. Bolayler
ed., 1946). Nor were the Armenians themselves unaware of the dangers looming on the horizon.
The years 1913 and 1914 up to the fall, when Turkey unilaterally intervened in the war and joined
the camp of the Central Powers, were periods of anxiety bordering on apprehension. Turkish
threats of retaliation as a response to the revival of the Armenian reform issue were especially
aggravating for the Armenians. Mecheroatitte (Paris, monthly, organ of Itila) 6, 50 (Jan. 1914):
44-45. Of particular significance are the threat letters sent to the Armenian press and to the
Armenian Patriarch. In a communication from November 12, 1913, the latter was addressed as
follows:
You accursed ones (melounlar) have brought many perils on the head of our
esteemed government [and] ... paved the way for foreign aggressions (Tejavouzat).
. . . You must know that the Young Turks have awakened now[.] . . . You
Armenians ... never forget where you live[.]... Turkish youth ... shall not delay
the execution of their assigned duties.
Haigaz K. Kazarian, How Turkey Prepared the Ground for Massacre, 18 ARMENIAN REV.,
Winter 1965, at 30, 31-32. It was signed: Islam Young Turks. Id. at 31. Four days later, a more
threatening letter was sent in which, among others, the following menacing lines were included:
The Turkish sword, to date, has cut down millions of Giavoors (infidels), nor has it
lost its intention to cut down millions more hereafter. Know this[:] that the Turks
have committed themselves, and have vowed to subdue and to clean up the
Armenian Giavoors who have become tubercular microbes for us.
Id. In one of the series of articles, published in the Armistice period in a newspaper edited by
himself, an Armenian agent of the Turkish secret police hinted that these letters were the work of
Hulseyin Azmi-at the time the Director General of Istanbul Police and an experienced handler of
secret operations-who played an important role in the preparation and initiation of the World
War I genocide in Istanbul. After the war, he and the other Ittihadist leaders escaped to Germany.
Haroutiun Mugurditchian, Kaghdnikneroun Gudzigu [The Web of Secrets], HAIRENIK
(Watertown, M.A.), Oct. 30/ Nov. 12, 1918, installment No. 2. An Armenian historian indicates
that already in December of 1913 a number of British public figures had warned the British
government that Turkey was bent on destroying the Ottoman Armenian population in the event
the Powers imposed the Reform Act upon Turkey. On September 18, 1914, member of Parliament
Aneurin Williams likewise informed British Foreign Minister Grey of the prevalence in Turkey of
a "great fear of a massacre." AKABY NASSIBIAN, BRITAIN AND THE ARMENIAN QUESTION 1915-
1923, at 31 (1984).
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those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres."73
THE ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES
Alleging treasonable acts, separatism, and other assorted acts by the
Armenians viewed as a national minority, the Ottoman authorities ordered
the wholesale deportation of the Armenian population of the Empire's
eastern and southeastern provinces under the guise of national security. 74
This measure was subsequently extended to virtually all of the Empire's
Armenian population, including such faraway cities as Bursa, Eski~ehir,
Konya, and the Ottoman capital, Istanbul."
73. GUERRE 1914-1918, TURQUIE, 887. 1. Armnie (May 26, 1915); FO 371/2488/51010
(May 28, 1915); A.A. TORKEI 183/37, A17667, K168, No. 21; Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1915, Supp., 981 (1928); U.S. National Archives, Record Group 59, 867. 4016/67 (May 28,
1915). See also the report of Polish jurist Litwaski, the Legal Officer of the U.N. War Crimes
Commission, who in addition to writing Chapter 11 in WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 54,
also prepared a separate report, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/W. 20/Corr. 1, at 1, no. 3 (1948). In these
works, including that of Schwelb, supra note 54, at 181, the May 28, 1915, date is a misprint for
May 24, 1915.
74. BAYUR, supra note 36, at 37-38.
75. German Embassy Charg6 von Neurath informed Berlin on November 12, 1915:
"According to a reliable source, the Turkish Government has, contrary to all assurances, decided
to deport the Armenians of Constantinople also." A.A. TORKEI, 183/40, A33705, R14089. On
December 7, 1915, German Ambassador Metternich informed Berlin that four thousand
Armenians had recently been removed from Constantinople, that the total number of those
deported from the Ottoman capital up to that time had reached thirty thousand, and that "gradually
a clean sweep will be made of the remaining [eighty thousand] Armenian inhabitants" of the
Ottoman capital. A.A. TORKEI 183/40, A36184, R14089. For additional corroboration of this
pattern of deportation of Istanbul's Armenians, see 2 SAMUEL ZURLINDEN, DER WELTKRIEG 705
(1918); HARRY STUERMER, Two WAR YEARS IN CONSTANTINOPLE 55 (E. Allen trans., 1917)
[hereinafter Two WAR YEARS] (author maintains that Istanbul police used daily quota system to
deport Armenians in groups ranging from two hundred to one thousand); HARRY STUERMER,
ZWEI KRIEGSJAHRE IN KONSTANTINOPEL 48-51 (1917) [hereinafter ZWEI KRIEGSJAHRE] (the
German original of Two WAR YEARS). See also ARNOLD TOYNBEE, ARMENIAN ATROCITIES:
THE MURDER OF A NATION 77-78 (1915); Ambassador Morgenthau's October 4, 1915, cipher
No. 1121, U.S. National Archives, RG 59/867.4016/159; AHMET REFIK, IKI KOMITE IKI KITAL
23-24 (1919) (Turkish intelligence officer recounting his own observations about "atrocious"
deaths of the victims of these cities "so far removed from the war zones"). See also Foreign
Ministry Archives of Austria, XL Interna, Konfidentenberichte 1914-1918, No. 272, Forderung
zur Tdrkisierung des Reiches, Situationsbericht No. 312, Konstantinopel, August 27, 1915. The
cautious operations of rounding up multitudes of lower class Armenians in the Ottoman capital
and the possibility of the apprehension and removal of higher class Armenians at an opportune
moment is underscored in this report. See also the following works containing the eyewitness
accounts of German correspondents and an American diplomat stationed in Istanbul. In a "very
confidential" report, the correspondent of Kolnische Zeitung, a major German newspaper, narrates
the procedures of the gradual liquidation of the Armenian population of the capital, concentrating
first on the provincials and singles, followed by the married ones and their families. Ridiculing the
government's claim that only those suspected of disloyalty are being arrested, the correspondent
argued:
[Tihe most harmless people are being deported in a very systematic way, such as the
two caretakers of my household; they just disappeared after being taken in custody..
• . I have authentic information that the arrests are being carried out absolutely at
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The execution of this order, ostensibly a wartime emergency measure of
relocation, actually masked a deliberate plan for the execution of the
Armenian population. The vast majority of the deportees perished through a
variety of direct and indirect atrocities perpetrated during the deportations.
As Winston Churchill wrote:
In 1915 the Turkish government began and ruthlessly carried out
the infamous general massacre and deportation of Armenians in
Asia Minor ... the clearance of the race from Asia Minor was about
as complete as such an act, on a scale so great, could well be[.]...
There is no reasonable doubt that this crime was planned and
executed for political reasons. The opportunity presented itself for
clearing Turkish soil of a Christian race opposed to all Turkish
ambitions, cherishing national ambitions that could be satisfied only
at the expense of Turkey, and planted geographically between
Turkish and Caucasian Moslems.76
random. The cautious procedure is due to the presence of ambassadors; once the
measures in the interior are brought to a completion, then it will be the turn of the
capital. This is the general impression among the pro-Turkish Germans.
A.A. TORKEI 183/38, A30432, R14087. The correspondent was Ernst von Nahmer whose two
reports, September 5 and 6, comprise together twenty-two pages; the quotations are from pp. 3-4.
He has a Nachlass (Papers) at Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Potsdam. Another correspondent provides
graphic details of the mass arrests in Constantinople based on daily quotas of "two hundred or a
thousand-to be delivered up daily from a certain quarter of the town-as I have been told was
the case by reliable Turks who were in full touch with the police organization and knew the
system of these deportations." Two WAR YEARS, supra this note, at 55. See also ZWEI
KRIEGSJAHRE, supra this note, at 44, 46-49, 54-55. A French demographer likewise maintains
that the Armenian population of Constantinople was subjected to "round-ups in the streets and to
executions." Daniel Panzac, L 'enjeu du nombre. La population de la Turquie de 1914 6 1927, 50
REVUE DE L'OCCIDENT MUSULMAN ET DE LA MEDITARRANtE 45, 61 (1988). Finally, reference
may be made to an American diplomat stationed in Turkey during most of the operations of
genocide. In the August 23, 1915, entry of his diary he notes that "in the capital ... the arrests of
Armenians are of daily occurrence." LEWIS EINSTEIN, INSIDE CONSTANTINOPLE 253 (1918). In
the September 8 entry, he speaks of new wholesale arrests "fresh consternation." Id. at 285.
76. WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE WORLD CRISIS: THE AFTERMATH 430 (1929).
Three massive volumes in English, German, and French document these atrocities,
relying mostly upon neutral observers (Swiss, American, Swedish), and German and Austrian
civilian and military officials stationed in Turkey as war-time allies. (1) TOYNBEE & BRYCE,
supra note 68 (Viscount Bryce, also author of the classic THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH
(1888), was Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford from 1870-1893, entered Parliament in
1880, and between 1907-1913 was Ambassador to the United States, signing the Anglo-American
Arbitration Treaty in 1911. After the war he was appointed Chairman of a Royal Commission on
German atrocities in Belgium and subsequently became a member of the Hague Permanent Court
of Arbitration); (2) J. LEPSIUS, DEUTSCHLAND UND ARMENIEN, supra note 63; (3) ARTHUR
BEYLERIAN, LES GRANDES PUISSANCES, L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN, ET LES ARMtNIENS DANS LES
ARCHIVES FRANCAISES 1914-1918 (1983). Because the Bryce volume was compiled during the
war, some critics questioned the impartiality and balance of its contents. To prove the veracity of
the work, Bryce submitted the material before publication to a number of scholars for evaluation.
TOYNBEE & BRYCE, supra note 68. Among them was Gilbert Murray, Regius Professor at
Oxford, who declared: "I realize that in times of persecution passions run high ...But the
evidence of these letters and reports will bear any scrutiny and overpower any skepticism. Their
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A secret propaganda campaign followed the deportation order and was
waged by Department II of the Turkish War Office. The campaign sought
to deflect blame from the Turkish government by labeling the Armenians a
national security threat. As one Turkish naval captain attached to that office
recounted:
In order to justify this enormous crime (bu muazzan cinayet) [of the
Armenian Genocide] the requisite propaganda material was
thoroughly prepared in Istanbul. [It included such statements as:]
"the Armenians are in league with the enemy. They will launch an
uprising in Istanbul, kill off the Ittihadist leaders and will succeed in
opening up the straits [to enable the Allied fleets to capture
Istanbul]." These vile and malicious incitements [were such,
however, that they] could persuade only people who were not even
able to feel the pangs of their own hunger.77
genuineness is established beyond question . Id. at xxxi. H.A.L. Fisher, Vice-Chancellor of
Sheffield University, declared:
The evidence here collected ... will carry conviction wherever and whenever it is
studied by honest enquirers . . . It is corroborated by reports received from
Americans, Danes, Swiss, Germans, Italians and other foreigners.., it is clear that a
catastrophe, conceived upon a scale quite unparalleled in modem history, has been
contrived for the Armenian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire.
Id. at xxix. Moorfield Storey, the former President of the American Bar Association, observed:
I have no doubt that, while there may be inaccuracies of detail, these statements
establish without any question the essential facts. It must be borne in mind that in
such a case the evidence of eye-witnesses is not easily obtained; the victims, with
few exceptions, are dead; the perpetrators will not confess ... Such statements as
you print are the best evidence which, in the circumstances, it is possible to obtain.
They come from persons holding positions which give weight to their words, and
from other persons with no motive to falsify, and it is impossible that such a body of
concurring evidence should have been manufactured . . . . In my opinion the
evidence which you print . . . establishes beyond any reasonable doubt, the
deliberate purpose of the Turkish authorities practically to exterminate the
Armenians, and their responsibility for the hideous atrocities which have been
perpetrated upon that unhappy people.
Id. at xxxi, xxxii. In commenting on Toynbee's competence and scrupulousness in compiling the
material, Bryce declared "[n]othing has been admitted the substantial truth of which seems open to
reasonable doubt. Facts only have been dealt with; questions of future policy have been carefully
avoided." Id. at xvi. In his note to Vice-Chancellor Fisher, Toynbee himself described the volume
as "an awful piece of history. Fortunately, one gets absorbed in the work of editing and arranging
the documents and half deadened to things themselves." FO 96/206/IV, Aug. 4, 1916. In the
circular attached to the volume and sent to 250 American publications, Toynbee noted, "The
fiendish character of the atrocities committed and the deliberate, systematic plan on which they
were organized from Constantinople appear to me to be the most striking features that emerge."
Id.
77. REFIK, supra note 75, at 40. Dismissing these pieces of agitation as crass propaganda that
"def[y] every logic," Refik returns to his central theme, that under the guise of deportation and
wartime relocation, Ittihad pursued the goal of "destroying (imha) the Armenians." Id. at 23. Refik
later became a Professor of History at the University of Istanbul. In his memoirs Interior Minister
Talt repeats this charge of an imminent Armenian uprising in Istanbul and the opening up of the
Straits for the fleet of the Allies to make the anti-Armenian measures look pre-emptive in nature
No. 11
182 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LA W & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. V
The main vehicle of this anti-Armenian agitation was the Ottoman
propaganda weekly Harb Mecmuas 'War Magazine.' Edited by Colonel
Seyfi, the head of Department I1 at the War Office, this weekly's influence
went well beyond its 15,000 subscribers. A Turkish newspaper during the
Armistice declared that it was Seyfi who, as director of the Political
Department at Ottoman General Headquarters, mapped the strategy of the
Armenian massacres. In close cooperation with Dr. B. $akir, and under the
auspices of the Ittihad party's Central Committee, he mobilized the qetes
'brigands' of the Special Organization.78 The Turkish government also
worked to deflect blame for the eventual killing of the Armenians through
its use of the Special Organization. The members of the Special
Organization, mostly ex-convicts, would be identified as the actual villains
and portrayed as "beyond the authority and control of the government." An
American author noted their recourse to this method and described the
unruly "group of brigands" who made up the Special Organization as "a
secret, rather disreputable group."79
Mobilization and deportation
Proclaiming a state of "armed neutrality," Turkey, with the assistance
of German staff officers, launched a general mobilization on August 3,
1914. Among those affected by this scheme were male Armenians, who
were inducted in three stages. First called were those between twenty and
forty-five years of age, followed by those between fifteen and twenty, and
finally those in the forty-five to sixty age group, who were used as pack
animals for the transport of military equipment. 8° About a month later, on
and as borne out of military necessity. PA$ANIN, supra note 72, at 73.
78. The newspaper was the daily Sabah, from which an Armenian daily, probably a day or
two later, repeated that declaration in summary form. ARIAMARD (namesake of Djagadamard),
Dec. 13, 1918. This shows the enormous power of Colonel Seyfi, a graduate of the Istanbul
Turkish War Staff Academy and a long-time Ittihadist supporter of war lord Enver. He later
became General, adopting the surname Duzgoren in the Turkish Republic. According to U.S.
Acting Secretary of State William Phillips, Seyfi "was vested with great power." FO 371/4173,
folio 345, March 20, 1919 (report to U.S. Ambassador to England, John Davis, assessing Seyfi's
liability as a top war criminal). British intelligence during the Armistice obtained a document from
the Turkish Interior Ministry's National Security Office files during the Armistice in which Seyfi
is described as one of the five top Ittihadist leaders plotting the genocide against the Armenians.
FO 371/4172/31307, folio 386. Seyfi's directing role in the operations of the Special Organization
is confirmed in the memoirs of a top S.O. leader operating in the Balkans, i.e., Colonel Fuat
Balkan. 2 FUAT BALKAN, YAKIN TARIHIMIZ 297 (1962). On the provocative contents of the
military periodical Polis Mecruuasi (Seyfi ed.), see H. Sirounee, Yegern Mu Yev Eer
Badmoutyunu [A Genocide and its History] in ETCHMIADZIN, Feb./Mar./Apr. 1965, 20 (the
official periodical of the Catholicosate in Armenia); GARABED KAPIKIAN, YEGHERNABADOUM
[THE CHRONICLE OF THE GENOCIDE... IN SIVAS] 89 (1924).
79. Philip Hendrick Stoddard, The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: A
Preliminary Study of the Tekilfti Mahsusa [Special Organization] 49-50 (1963) (unpublished
thesis, Princeton University).
80. American Ambassador Morgenthau describes the use of these Armenian conscripts as
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September 6, 1914, the Interior Ministry utilized a cipher circular to instruct
the provincial authorities to keep Armenian political and community leaders
under surveillance. When Turkey finally entered the war two months later
through a pre-emptive attack on Russian seaports and shipping in the Black
Sea, t the military's emergency measures assumed inordinate dimensions of
severity. The requisitions in particular stripped the provincial Armenian
population of most of their accumulated goods. The confiscation included
almost anything subsumed under the general category of supplies and
provisions for the army. 2 Widespread governmental provocations, during
which some Armenians clashed with gendarmes and soldiers who were
harassing them, accentuated these hardships.83 There were also sporadic
acts of sabotage performed by isolated groups of Armenians. 4 This unrest
pack animals and their eventual destruction as follows:
Army supplies of all kinds were loaded on their backs, and, stumbling under the
burdens and driven by the whips and bayonets of the Turks ... almost waist high
through snow .... If any stragglers succeeded in reaching their destinations, they
were not infrequently massacred. In many instances, Armenian soldiers were
disposed of in even summary fashion, for it now became almost the general practice
to shoot them in cold blood.
HENRY MORGENTHAU, AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU'S STORY 302 (1918). For the German role
in the organizing of the mobilization plan see BAYUR, supra note 36, vol. 3:1, at 476. For the
conscription order see Morgenthau's August 10, 1915 dispatch to Washington in U.S. National
Archives, RG 59.867.4016/74; GALIP VARDAR, ITTIHAD VE TERAKKI ICINDE DONENLER [THE
CURTAIN OF SECRECY: THE INSIDE STORY OF ITTIHAD] 271 (Samih Nafiz trans., 1960).
81. TRUMPENER, supra note 61, at 51.
82. In discussing these requisitions, Dr. Harry Stuermer, the Istanbul correspondent of the
influential German daily newspaper Kilnische Zeitung, noted:
When I speak of requisitioning, I do not mean the necessary military carrying off of
grain, cattle, vehicles, buffaloes, and horses, general equipment, and so on ... I do
not mean that, even though the way it was accomplished bled the country far more
than was necessary, falling as it did in the country districts into the hands of
ignorant, brutal, and fanatical underlings, and in the town being carried out with
every kind of refinement by the central authorities. Too often it was a means of
violent 'nationalisation' and deprivation of property and rights exercised especially
against Armenians, Greeks, and subjects of other Entente countries.
Two WAR YEARS, supra note 75, at 115.
83. See TOYNBEE & BRYCE, supra note 68, at 33-36 (American nurse Grace Knapp's
eyewitness account). See also CLARENCE D. USSHER & GRACE H. KNAPP, AN AMERICAN
PHYSICIAN IN TURKEY 264-65 (1917); RAFAEL DE NOGALES, FOUR YEARS BENEATH THE
CRESCENT 60-70, 80-89, 95 (M. Lee trans., 1926) (detailed description of Venezuelan officer
who led Turkish artillery in reducing Armenian defenses in Van).
84. MORGENTHAU, supra note 80, at 304-05. As Morgenthau related, some Armenians
"proposed to defend their own lives and their women's honour against the outrages[.] ... Nothing
was sacred to the Turkish gendarmes under the plea of searching for hidden arms, they ransacked
churches, treated the altars and sacred utensils with the utmost indignity[.] . . . They would beat
the priests into insensibility." Commenting on his intimate exchanges with "authoritative Turkish
personalities," in a December 4, 1916, summary report to his Chancellor in Berlin, Erzerum's
German Vice Consul, Captain von Scheubner-Richter, reveals the incidence of Turkish plans to
provoke Armenians into "acts of self-defense" that then were used as a basis for "inflated
descriptions" of Armenian insurgency and, therefore, as "pretexts" for subsequent operations of
murder. A.A. TORKEI 183/45, A33457, R14094. On April 26, 1915, the German Consulate at
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culminated in the Interior Ministry's issuing of the order of April 24, 1915,
which authorized the arrest of all Armenian political and community leaders
suspected of anti-Ittihad or nationalistic sentiments. Thousands of
Armenians were seized and incarcerated. In Istanbul alone, 2,345 such
leaders were arrested, 5 most of whom were subsequently executed. Except
for a small minority, none of them were either nationalists or in any way
involved in politics. Most significantly, none of them were tried and found
guilty of war-time sabotage, espionage, or any other crime.
The last and decisive stage of the process of reducing the bulk of the
Armenian population to absolute helplessness was merciless deportation. In
a memorandum dated May 26, 1915, the Interior Minister requested that the
Grand Vizier enact a special law authorizing such deportations. The
memorandum was endorsed on May 29, 1915, by the Grand Vizier even
though, as required by law, the Cabinet did not act on it first. Instead, it did
so on May 30, 1915. Meanwhile, the press had already announced the
promulgation of the new emergency law called the Temporary Law of
Deportation 6 on May 27, 1915. Without referring to the Armenians, the law
authorized the Commanders of Armies, Army Corps, Divisions, and
Commandants of the local garrisons to order the deportation of population
clusters on the mere suspicion of espionage, treason, and for reasons of
military necessity. The key word was hissetmek 'sensing.' The authorities,
empowered to order deportations, had merely to have a feel, or a sense, of
looming offence or danger.8 7 This purposefully vague but sweeping
authorization resulted in the deportation of the bulk of Turkey's Armenian
population. As one Turkish historian admitted, the Interior Minister "was
intent on creating an accomplished fact," and "railroad[ed] the Cabinet
Adana relayed to the German Embassy the German text of a lengthy report in which the Armenian
Supreme Patriarch of the See of Cilicia bitterly complains to the Armenian Patriarch in Istanbul of
"the outrageous atrocities and mistreatments the sole purpose of which is to provoke the peaceful
people of the region to extreme acts in order to provide the government an excuse for
annihilation." A.A. BOTSCHAFT KONSTANTINOPEL, 168 (No. 2540). See also LEPSIUS, supra note
9, at 53-54. The purpose of these provocations evidently was the creation of the basis to send
highly inflated reports of Armenian acts of rebelliousness to the Ottoman High Command and the
party leadership in Istanbul. In his affidavit, prepared at the request of the post-war Turkish
Military Tribunal, the military commandant of Yozgat district in Ankara province-and at the
same time the head of the local Draft Board-exposed the resort to "the preparation of official and
unofficial reports to military authorities, mainly [Army] Corps and divisional commanders,
vilifying the Armenians and thereby paving the ground for drastic measures against them." Major
Mehmed Salim (Yozgat $ube Reisi ve Mevki Kumandani) affidavit copy is deposited at Jerusalem
Armenian Patriarchate Archive, indexed under the Armenian alphabet character H (pronounced
Ho, the 16th letter, and not its variant Hee, the 2 1st), File 21, M572, bearing the date of January 5,
1919.
85. ESAT URAS, TARIHTE ERMENILER VE ERMENI MESELESI [THE ARMENIANS AND THE
ARMENIAN QUESTION IN HISTORY] 612 (2d ed. 1976).
86. For the English text of the law, see RICHARD G. HOVANNISIAN, ARMENIA ON THE ROAD
TO INDEPENDENCE 1918, at 51 (1967).
87. TAKVIMI VEKAYI (Turk.), No. 2189, May 19/June 1, 1915.
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approval of the law" by beginning to administer the deportations prior to
submitting his draft bill to the full Cabinet.88 The Temporary Law of
Deportation, it should be noted, was eventually repealed "on account of its
unconstitutionality" in a stormy November 4, 1918, session of the post-war
Ottoman Parliament. During this session, the Armenian Massacres, the
scope of the victims, and the responsibility of the government, were
debated.89
Expropriation and confiscation of goods and assets
A supplementary law enacted on June 10, 1915, contained instructions
on how to register the property of the deportees, how to safeguard it, and
how to dispose of others through public auctions. The revenue was to be
held in trust for remittance to the owners upon their return after the war.9"
Another temporary law promulgated on September 26, 1915, disposed of
the deportees' goods and property. It provided for the handling of the debts,
credits, and assets of the deportees. In relaying this new law to the German
Foreign Office, Arthur Gwinner, the Director of the Deutsche Bank,
sarcastically stated that eleven articles might well have been compressed
into the following two: "1. All goods of the Armenians are confiscated. 2.
The government will cash in the credits of the deportees and will repay (or
not repay) their debts." 91
Unlike the Temporary Law of Deportation, which though approved by
the Cabinet was never promulgated by the Ottoman Parliament as required
88. BAYUR, supra note 36, at 38. See also TUNAYA, supra note 43, vol. 1, at 579 (the author
characterizes this "accomplished fact" as typical of Ittihad daring to bypass the regular channels of
the government). According to the testimony of Finance Minsiter Cavid, the General Mobilization
on August 2/3, 1914, was likewise ordered prior to the approval of the Cabinet. Vakit, HARB
KABINELERININ ISTICVABI [THE WAR CABINET'S HEARINGS] 81 (1933) (Turk.) [hereinafter WAR
CABINET'S HEARINGS].
89. ZHAMANAG [ISTANBUL DAILY], Nov. 5, 1918. The repeal is described by 3 KUTAY,
TALAT PASANIN GURBET HATIRALARI [THE MEMOIRS OF TALAT PA$A IN EXILE] 1512 (1983).
90. FO 371/4241/170751. The thirty-four articles are reproduced in DOCUMENTS 76-80 (vol.
1, 1982) (a compilation of ciphers and letters assembled by the Press and Information Office of
Turkey's Prime Minister to justify or explain away the anti-Armenian measures). See also
TAKVIMI VEKAYI (Turk.), Oct. 1/14, 1916.
91. A.A. TORKEI 183/39, A29127 Oct 7, 1915, report. The French text of the eleven articles
is found in A.A. TORKEI 183/39, A29127, R14088 and LEPSIUS, supra note 63, at 214-16. In
reacting to the same law, the Austrian Military Plenipotentiary dismissed "the whole thing [as] a
comedy." JOSEPH POMIANKOWSKI, DER ZUSAMMERBRUCH DES OTTOMANISCHEN REICHES 161(1969). As if to punctuate this lethal melodrama, the Turkish authorities-in another promulgation
of a Temporary Law of October 5, 1916-pretended that the deportees were to be relocated free of
charge in houses and other places of abode. When relaying this news to Berlin, Dr. Goppert, the
legal counsellor of the German Embassy, diplomatically let it be known that the claim of
relocation was a farce. A.A. TORKEI 183/45, A28792, R14094. Oct. 20, 1916 report. An American
diplomat at the U.S. Embassy in the Ottoman capital characterized this pretense of "relocation" as
a "grim horror of paternal solicitude to cover barbarous massacres." Lewis Einstein, The
Armenian Massacres, CONTEMP. REV. 490 (Apr. 1917).
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by Article 36 of the Ottoman Constitution, the Ottoman Senate publicly
debated the Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confiscation ("The
Temporary Law"). Over a two month period-from October 4 through
December 13, 1915-a lone senator, Ahmed Riza, raised his voice in
opposition to the proposed measure.92 The evolving debate sheds further
light on the political forces and biases that shaped the Ottoman
government's decisions.
In the September 21/October 4, 1915 session of the Senate, for
example, Riza pleaded with his government to allow the deportees,
"hundreds and thousands of whom, women and children and old people, are
helplessly and miserably wandering around in the streets and mountains of
Anatolia[,] to return to their original places of residence or to settle
wherever they wish before the onset of the winter."93 He then submitted a
draft bill that proposed to postpone the Temporary Law's application until
the end of the war.
94
Senator Riza claimed that the Temporary Law was contrary to Article
16 of the Ottoman Constitution because it was announced two days before
the convening of the Parliament. He further argued that "[iut is also inimical
to the principles of law and justice. This law must, therefore, pass first
through the Parliament and go into effect only after the end of the war.
Hence, on the basis of [A]rticle 53 of the Constitution[,] I request the
adoption of the change as proposed in the bill before us."95 The ensuing
debate revealed that the parliamentarians knew nothing about the
Temporary Law in question, and that nobody knew when, if ever, it would
come to the Parliament for consideration. Therefore, no proposal for change
would be entertained. Following Senator Riza's expression of concern that
the Temporary Law might either arrive at the Parliament too late or not at
all, the Senate voted to transmit the senator's bill to the Legislative Acts
Committee of the Senate.
In the October 19/November 1, 1915, session of the Senate, Senator
92. LEPSIUS, supra note 63, at 216-18. Senator Ahmed Riza was one of the original founders
of Ittihad. Subsequently, however, he became a dissident fighting vigorously against Ittihad
excesses. On October 19, 1918, in his first post-war speech in the Senate, Riza invoked the
memory of "the Armenians who were murdered in a beastly manner." A.A. TURKEI 201/9,
A46488, R14088. Quoting the Senator directly, Tunaya reproduces the original Turkish words,
"vah~ice oldfirulen." TUNAYA, supra note 43, vol. 3, at 156.
93. LEPSIUS, supra note 63, at 216.
94. For this purpose, the bill proposed to amend Article 2 of the Temporary Law to read as
follows: "This law goes into effect after the end of the World War and one month after the signing
of the peace treaty." Id.
95. Id. at 217. For specific references to the Transcripts of the Records of the Senate covering
the sessions during which Senator Ahmed Riza interpolated on behalf of the Armenians, see
TUNAYA, supra note 43, at 577; SANDERS, supra note 50, vol. 1; 1 S. AK$IN, HUKOMEILERI VE
MILLI MOCADELE [THE ISTANBUL GOVERNMENTS AND THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE] 42-43
(1983).
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Riza again urged his fellow legislators to consider the suffering of the
wretched deportees in the rigors of the Anatolian mountains and provide
relief before the onset of the winter season. He requested that the Senate
expedite relief, which the government had formally promised to provide
according to the president of the Senate.96 In discussing these debates,
prominent Turkish historian Bayur noted the pressures brought to bear upon
Senator Riza to withdraw his bill. One Deputy shouted at Riza that "this is
not the time to provoke rumours,"97 alluding to the delicate political matter
of the massacres that were still in progress. Bayur states that Senator Riza
was especially harassed during the November 24/December 7, 1915,
session when the Senate decided to consider the bill only after it was
formerly reported to the Senate. As Bayur observed, "[T]wo and a half
months had elapsed since the bill was introduced and the Chamber of
Deputies hadn't even begun to consider it. Clearly, the Parliament was
intent on sanctioning the application of the Temporary Law while putting
Riza's bill 'to sleep."'' 98
During the November 30/December 13, 1915, session, Senator Riza
once more raised his voice to protest the subversion of the Constitution,
which forbade the implementation of any law before the Parliament passes
it while in session. Since the law had been introduced in the Chamber of
Deputies for consideration and debate after the Chamber had convened,
Riza argued that the matter became the concern of the Legislative branch.
Focusing on the key elements of the Temporary Law, the Senator raised the
following objection:
It is unlawful to designate the Armenian assets and properties as
'abandoned goods' [emvall metruke][,] for the Armenians, the
proprietors, did not abandon their properties voluntarily; they were
forcibly, compulsively [zorla, cebren] removed from their
domiciles and were brutally exiled. Now the government through its
officials is selling their goods .... Nobody can sell my property if I
am unwilling to sell it. Article 21 of the Constitution forbids it. If
we are a constitutional regime functioning in accordance with
constitutional law we can't do this. This is atrocious. Grab my arm,
eject me from my village, then sell my good[s] and properties, such
a thing can never be permissible. Neither the conscience of the
Ottomans nor the law can allow it.99
96. A.A. TORKEI 183/39, A33514, R14105, Oct. 19/Nov. 1, 1915, report.
97. BAYUR, supra note 36, at 46.
98. Id. at 46-49.
99. Id. at 48. Dr. Harry Stuermer, the Istanbul correspondent of the German daily newspaper
Kolnische Zeitung, relates an incident at the same Parliament when war lord Enver, Talft's
acolyte, "went so far as to hurl the epithet 'shameless dog' [edebsiz kopek] at Ahmed Riza in the
Senate without being called to order by the President." STUERMER, supra note 75, at 256. See also
ZWEI KRIEGSJAHRE, supra note 75, at 232. Turkish historian Ahmed Refik, an eyewitness of the
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In his November 4, 1915 communication to the State Department,
Morgenthau confirmed the occurrence of these debates. He further
disclosed that Talt himself exerted the greatest pressure upon Senator Riza
by threatening to initiate more severe measures against the Armenians
should Riza continue his agitation on their behalf: "From other sources it is
stated that the Cabinet promised to modify [its] attitude towards the
Armenians if Ahmed Riza and his friends would agree not to interpolate the
government. This Ahmed Riza did not [do]."' 0 The Temporary Law was
thus left intact. A Turkish Armistice government facing the victorious
Allies '0' subsequently annulled the law on January 8, 1920, but the
insurgent Kemalists reversed the annulment on September 14, 1922."02
During the November-December 1918 hearings of the Fifth Committee
of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, which investigated the wartime
many procedures of expropriation, relates a scene in the city of Ankara where the Armenians were
reportedly forced to give back money they had gotten right after selling their property to local
Turks. Expressing dismay and shame, Refik wrote, "No government had at any time in history
committed such a vicious crime [gaddarane bir cinayet]. There is going to be a day of reckoning
for this crime against humanity [be~eriyet namina bir cinayet]. REFIK, supra note 75, at 41-42.
100. U.S. NationalArchives, R.G. 59, 867.00/797 1/2, U.S. Foreign Relations. L. 763. Further
confirmations of this conflict between Senator Riza and the Ittihad government can be found in
A.A. TORKEI 183/39. A33514, R14088. MORGENTHAU, supra note 80, at 339. The importance of
economic motives in the genocide is highlighted by the following incident:
Ambassador Morgenthau wrote the following in the diary he kept during the war:
One day Taldt made what was perhaps the most astonishing request I had ever heard.
The New York Life Insurance Company and the Equitable Life of New York had for
years done considerable business among the Armenians. The extent to which this
people insured their lives was merely another indication of their thrifty habits.
'I wish,' Taldt now said, 'that you would get the American life insurance companies
to send us a complete list of their Armenian policy holders. They are practically all
dead now and have left no heirs to collect the money. It of course all escheats to the
State. The Government is the beneficiary now. Will you do so?' This was almost too
much, and I lost my temper. 'You will get no such list from me,' I said, and I got up
and left him.
Id.
101. GOTTHARD JAESCHKE, TORK INKILABI KRONOLOJISI 1918-1923 [THE CHRONOLOGY OF
THE TURKISH REVOLUTION], at 61 (N.R. Aksu trans., 1939) (citing TAKVIMI VEKAYI No. 3747).
102. Id. at 136 (citing I T.B.M.M., KAVANIN MECMUASI 482 (1922) (the Code of Public Laws
of the newly established Ankara government)). There are several works treating the issue of
confiscations during the war. After extensive legal debate, four prominent experts in international
law decided that the Armenian survivors were entitled to reclaim their property and assets and
related massive indemnities. These arguments are compiled in a book by COMITE CENTRAL DES
RIEFUGIES ARMENIENS, CONFISCATION DES BIENS DES REFUGIES ARMENIENS PAR LE
GOUVERNEMENT TURC (1929). Some more recent works include KEVORK K. BAGHDJIAN, LA
CONFISCATION, PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT TURC, DES BIENS ARMENIENS ... DITS "ABANDONNES"
(1987); SHAVARSH TORIGUIAN, THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 85-96
(ULV Press, 2d ed. 1988); L. VARTAN, HAIGAGAN DASNIHUNKU YEV HAYERU LUKIAL
KOUYKERU [THE ARMENIAN DATE OF 1915 AND THE ABANDONED GOODS OF THE ARMENIANS]
(1970).
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massacres, several Turkish Deputies took former Justice Minister Ibrahim
to task over the illegal aspects of the expropriation. One of them pointed out
the widespread "robberies and plunders" that were committed in the course
of the confiscations.1 3 Ibrahim conceded that his government officials
investigated "abuses" that occurred. I" Other observers were less charitable
in their analysis. The Swiss historian Samuel Zurlinden quoted in a detailed
study of the Armenian Genocide "a knowledgeable German" source who
had stated that "what really happened was an expropriation carried out on
the greatest scale against 1.5 million citizens."' 1 5 At Aleppo, American
Consul Jackson pointed to the major role the confiscation played in the
genocidal scheme of the Turkish government. Jackson identified the
genocide as "a gigantic plundering scheme as well as a final blow to
extinguish the [Armenian] race."'0 6 Turkish historian Dogan Avctoglu
confirms this point by stating that after the European interventions of 1856-
78, "[t]here emerged a need to radically solve this problem. The
nationalization of the economy was the complementary part of this policy.
Among those who quickly enriched themselves in the process of the
expropriation of the Armenians were [Ittihad] party influentials, ex-officers
serving as party operatives, and Turkish immigrants.' 10 7
Neither the text of the Temporary Law on Deportations nor that of the
Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confiscation referred specifically to
the Armenians or, in fact, to any nationality. During the secret
Parliamentary debates of the fledgling Turkish Republic convening in
Ankara after World War I, however, Turkish deputies were told that general
terms were used to conceal the true purposes of the law from the
Armenians. This fact emerged during the debate on April 3, 1924, when
103. WAR CABINET'S HEARINGS, supra note 88, at 527. These abuses were brought out in the
open in some memoirs and public debates in the aftermath of the war. In the Grand National
Assembly on December 6, 1920, Trabzon's Deputy Ali $ukr lamented the fact that "[t]he so
called Abandoned Goods ended up becoming the property of the grabbers. What was the result of
your shouts and protests?" 4 YAKIN TARIHIMIZ 77 (1962) (Turk.). A similar observation was
made at the November 18, 1922 session of the Assembly by Yozgad Deputy Feyyaz Ali. 3
TBMM, GIZLI CELSE ZABITLARI 1065 (1985) [hereinafter TBMM]. Moreover, in his memoirs,
Economics Minister Cavid admitted that on November 9, 1918, he ordered using up-consider
changing to "spending"-one million Turkish Pounds from the proceeds of the abandoned goods
scheme. TANIN, Aug. 30, 1945 (Turk.).
104. WAR CABINET'S HEARINGS, supra note 88, at 519.
105. ZURLINDEN, supra note 75, at 596.
106. Letter from J. B. Jackson, American Consul at Aleppo, Syria, to Henry Morgenthau,
American Ambassador, U.S. National Archives, NAIRG59.867.4016/148 (Aug. 19, 1915)
(enclosed in Ambassador Morgenthau's August 30, 1915 report).
107. 3 DOGAN AvcIOGLU, MILLI KURTULU; TARIHI, 1838'DEN 1995'E [HISTORY OF
NATIONAL LIBERATION] 1137, 1141 (1974). Sina Ak~in likewise maintains that the Armenian
deportations were implemented in pursuit of economic goals, which eliminated minority
dominance and competition in business and industry, allowing Muslims to control these areas. See
SINA AKSIN, 100 SORUDA JON TURKLER VE ITTIHAT VE TERAKKI [ITTIHAD VE TERAKKI IN THE
CONTEXT OF 100 QUESTIONS] 283 (1980).
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Deputy Musa Kdz im objected to Article 2 of a fiscal bill draft that used the
covert formula, siyasi ziimre 'a political body of people', to target non-
Muslim minorities. He argued that "[t]he guilt of a person should be
determined in a court of law. In my opinion, the insertion in a bill of
economic character of a clause smacking of politics is very much out of
place. It is a shame. I implore you to let us remove it."' t In responding to
this objection, former Finance Minister Hasan Fehmi, representing the
Parliamentary Commission in charge of preparing the bill in question,
explained the rationale of secretly targeting non-Muslims. Given the risks
involved when specifically identifying them in the bill, he said that the
Commission had secretly made a deal with the Finance Minister to the
effect that the Muslims were to be excluded from the application of the law.
In this connection, he revealed the fact that the same procedure had been
adopted during the war when the September 13/26, 1915 Temporary Law
on Expropriation and Confiscation was instituted. He stated:
Not a single Muslim's good were liquidated-you can establish
these facts by examining the old records of the secret deliberations.
The Parliament at that time secretly secured reassurances from the
Finance Minister that the law would not apply to Muslims who
likewise had fled as a result of the war. Only after registering this
assurance did we proclaim to the world the enactment of that law.
Presently, we are repeating that procedure.'0 9
Deputy Kz t im thereupon withdrew his motion and the bill was approved." 0
Intent and outcome
Contrary to the avowals of the Ottoman authorities who implemented
these emergency laws, the Armenians did not return from the
deportations."' The deportations proved to be a cover for the ensuing
108. TBMM, supra note 103, vol. 4, at 429 (Transcripts of the 28th Secret Session, second
sitting, of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, March 2, 1923-October 25, 1934).
109. Id. The explanations of former Finance Minister Hasan Fehmi (Ataq) are as significant as
the fact that his elevation to a ministerial post by Mustafa Kemal Atatfirk on April 24, 1933, raised
eyebrows among the latter's associates on account of the fact that he was "uneducated."
AVCIOtiLU, supra note 107, vol. 2, at 640.
110. TBMM, supra note 103, vol. 4, at 429. The Finance Minister at the time was Mustafa
Abdulhalik, who was present at the sitting and promised to execute the law as formulated. His
pivotal role in the Armenian Genocide as governor of two large provinces, Bitlis and Aleppo, and
as deputy to Talit in the Interior Ministry is discussed in Dadrian, supra note 68, at 332, 336-38.
It is noteworthy that during the debate several deputies singled out the Jews with the derogatory
Turkish epithet "Mi~on," denouncing them as the real "blood-suckers" of Turkey and insisting
that the law should apply to them with special emphasis. TBMM, supra note 103, vol. 4, at 430-
31.
Ill. 2 STANDFORD J. SHAW & EZEL KURAL SHAW, HISTORY OF THE OT7OMAN EMPIRE AND
MODERN TURKEY 315 (1977). In establishing this fact, however, the authors completely ignore
the deceptiveness of these avowals. The official decree ordering the wholesale deportation of
Trabzon province's Armenian population expressly told the deportees that "their exile is only
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wholesale destruction of the targeted victim population. As the American
Ambassador Morgenthau observed:
The real purpose of the deportation was robbery and destruction; it
really represented a new method of massacre. When the Turkish
authorities gave the orders for these deportations, they were merely
giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood this well,
and, in their conversations with me, they made no particular attempt
to conceal the fact.'
1 2
By official Turkish accounts alone, those directly killed numbered
about 800,000, 1 not counting the tens of thousands of wartime conscripts
liquidated by the military. To quote Morgenthau again:
In many instances Armenian soldiers were disposed of in even more
summary fashion, for it now became almost the general practice to
shoot them in cold blood. In almost all cases the procedure was the
same. Here and there squads of 50 or 100 men would be taken,
bound together in groups of four, and then marched out to a
secluded spot a short distance from the village. Suddenly the sound
of rifle shots would fill the air, and the Turkish soldiers who had
acted as the escort would sullenly return to the camp. Those sent to
bury the bodies would find them almost invariably stark naked, for,
as usual, the Turks had stolen all their clothes. In cases that came to
my attention, the murderers had added a refinement to the victims'
sufferings by compelling them to dig their graves before being
shot. 14
In an October 2, 1916 message to his ambassador in Istanbul, German
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Zimmermann-who six weeks later
replaced Jagow as Foreign Minister--denounced the exterminations
accompanying the deportations. He also denounced the forcible "mass
conversions" to Islam of Armenian children whose parents had been killed,
as cause for "indignation in the entire civilized world.""' 5 He added that he
had discussed his feelings on this point with the Turkish Foreign Minister
temporary." Report from Henry Morgenthau, American Ambassador, to U.S. Secretary of State,
U.S. National Archives, NA/RG59/867.4016/106 (July 26, 1915).
112. MORGENTHAU, supra note 80, at 309.
113. This figure was released by a post-war Turkish Interior Minister, relying on statistics
compiled by his Ministry. See Dadrian, supra note 68, at 342. In a recent volume authored by
Turkish historian Bayur, this figure was confirmed as a more or less accurate computation by
Turkish authorities. BAYUR, supra note 36, vol. 3:4, at 787. This 800,000 figure was likewise
confirmed by Mustafa Kemal Atartirk himself in the course of an exchange with American Major
General Harbord, the chief of the American Military Mission to Armenia, in September 1919. 3
YAKIN TARIHIMIZ 179 (1962) (Turk.).
114. MORGENTHAU, supra note 80, at 302-03.
115. Two prominent Turkish authors likewise denounced the practice of forcing Islam on
Armenians orphans. See HALID EDIB, THE TURKISH ORDEAL 16 (1928); AVCIOcLU, supra note
107, at 1141.
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Halil. In that communication, Zimmermann used the dubious expression




Several factors are seen emerging as pivotal in the incidence of the
wartime Armenian Genocide. Foremost among them is the Turko-Armenian
conflict, which provides an essential historical framework by which to
study that Genocide. The cumulative aspects of this conflict are seen as the
matrix of a process through which that conflict progressively intensified
and ultimately became explosive. The resort to genocide by the perpetrator
camp is thus viewed as an attempt to radically resolve that conflict. Such a
task-performance is necessarily contingent on critically disparate power
relations obtained by the potential perpetrator and the potential victim
group. In other words, successful genocidal enactments are contingent upon
a fundamental condition, namely, a critical disparity of power relations. The
functional importance of such a power differential has historically almost
always proven decisive for the genocidal outcomes of such lingering
conflicts. Thus, evolving power relations are viewed within such a
framework of conflict-laden relations as the crux of the problem. What
remains constant, however, is the structural vulnerability of the potential
victim group in a socio-political system where power is associated with the
dominant group status of the perpetrator, and by the same token,
vulnerability flows from a minority group status. In and of themselves, such
disparities in power relations are not necessarily conducive to explosive
conflicts precipitating genocidal outbursts. There is a need to consider
special types of potential perpetrator groups confronting special types of
victim groups. The particularity in question here serves also to determine
the nature and outcome of the conflict itself.
It is most significant that the two instances of mass murder treated in
this study, the 1909 twin Adana Massacres and the World War I Genocide,
were committed during the autocratic rule of the Ittihadist political party. It
is equally significant that the empire-wide massacres in the 1894-96 period,
which are not covered in this essay, were also the by-product of the
autocratic regime of Sultan Abdul Hamit. What is at stake here is the
concentration of power and its near-monopolistic exercise by dictatorial
regimes bent on resolving domestic conflicts through reckless abuse of
power and reinforced by an atavistic penchant for murderous violence. Such
mechanisms of reinforcement require special attention, inquiry, and
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attempts at explanation. What are the latitudes-the so-called Spielraums-
that afford perpetrators the audacity to commit mass murder? The historical
experience of the Armenians is such as to yield a relevant answer, namely,
the calculated anticipation of impunity by the perpetrator camp. Throughout
the modem era of Armenian history, a series of periodic massacres were
inflicted upon the victims, and the arch perpetrators nearly always
remarkably escaped punishment. In other words, while impunity has
become the haunting by-product of the Armenian experience of
victimization in modem times, it simultaneously emerged as a reliable end-
product for the perpetrator camp bent on profiting from its criminality.
Nowhere is this condition more evident, nor more astounding, as in the
statement from Taldt, the principal architect of the wartime Armenian
Genocide. In his capacity as Interior Minister and CUP Party Chief, he had
an exchange with Halide Edib, who at the time was both a CUP partisan
and a prominent Turkish feminist. Edib quotes him as declaring, "I have the
conviction that as long as a nation does the best for its own interests, and
succeeds, the world admires it and thinks it moral.""' 7 (Emphasis Added)
This form of fixation on successful outcomes as a standard of conduct, as
well as the attendant indifference to the nature of the deed producing that
outcome, is emblematic of typical genocidal decision-making. It epitomizes
the intoxicating spell of impunity in the wake of a crime. In this way, it
helps engender stimuli for new ventures of criminality, while enabling the
actor to persist in the denial of both the victim and the act itself.
The overarching illegality of the origins and evolving career of the CUP
regime supersedes all of these considerations in both import and
consequence. It was the type of illegality that, completely devoid of
elements of responsibility and accountability, readily degenerated into
lethal criminality. In the process, the functions of the state were
overwhelmed by the imposition on the respective system of the desiderata
of a highly monolithic and dictatorial political party. The subversion and
ultimate criminalization of these state functions thus became the order of
the day. The January 1913 Young Turk overthrow of the government and
the subsequent political purges throughout the land are the incipient
initiatives of this process. The common pattern of substituting party
authority of the CUP with all its variants for legitimate state authority is all
too evident. Accordingly, the cardinal lesson to be derived from this essay
is that the most important determinant in cases of genocide is not the
state-to whose powers and resources are generally attributed the latitude
for genocidal decision-making and its associated enactment-but rather the
progressively incremental power structure of a dictatorial political party.
Equally important is the fact of the illicit capture of constitutional authority
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and its transfer from the legitimate state to a political party that is mobilized
with highly secretive and radical exterminatory designs. Such illicit action
is capable of providing the requisite dynamics for genocidal radicalism.
Among the many ways in which state functions are thus subverted, perhaps
the most consequential is that many of these functions are reduced and
instrumental to the hidden goals of the party. In other words, in addition to
subverting its functions, the quasi-omnipotent party specifically aims to
reduce the state to a level of optimal subservience. Thus, in one way or
another, the state ultimately becomes complicit in the series of crimes that
inevitably ensues. This is a process that might be called radical and deadly
task-performance. Such an outcome was foreseen by Aristotle when he
declared nearly twenty-five centuries ago that "when separated from law
and justice [man] is the worst of all [animals].""'
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